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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1981 the Israeli air force bombed the Iraqi nuclear complex
at Tuwaitha.' The attack was strongly condemned by the U.N. Security
Council as a "clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the
norms of international conduct."2 Nearly ten years after voting to condemn
t Research Associate, Center for International Relations, University of California at Los Angeles;
Ph.D. 1990, Georgetown University; M.S. 1983, London School of Economics and Political Science. The
author acknowledges with gratitude the encouragement and support of Professor Richard Rosecrance,
Professor Anthony Clark Arend, and Thomas K. Plofchan. The author would also like to extend a special
word of thanks to Professor John Setear for his many discerning comments and observations. Finally, the
author expresses his profound gratitude to the staff of The Yale Journal of International Law, and
especially Ms. Natalie Coburn for her energy and insight.
1. David K. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at Al.
2. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 58, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 (1981).
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the Israeli raid, the United States struck at the same target.' Unlike the Israeli
raid, the American action was not denounced by a Security Council
resolution.
The absence of any Security Council action denouncing the American raid
is particularly striking in light of the language of Resolution 678, which
authorized military action against Iraq. While the United States made Iraq's
nuclear ambitions, as much as Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, a justification for
the use of military force during the fall of 1990,' the Security Council made
no mention of Iraq's nuclear weapons program in its resolution sanctioning
military action against Iraq. Resolution 678 only authorized member nations
to "use all necessary means" to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to
"restore international peace and security."'
Not only did the Security Council never condemn the American raid on
Tuwaitha, but subsequently, it actually endorsed the strike through actions that
made the raid itself seem insignificant. As part of its terms to end the war, the
Security Council ordered Iraq to destroy all manufacturing capabilities for the
production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as those for
ballistic missiles.6 While Iraq's nuclear and biological weapon programs may
have violated its treaty obligations,7 its possession of chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles was not prohibited by international law.8 The Security
3. Rick Atkinson & Ann Devroy, U.S. Claims Iraqi Nuclear Reactors Hit Hard, WASH. POST, Jan.
21, 1991, at Al.
4. In trying to rally public support for its stand against Iraq, the Bush administration initially stressed
the economic consequences of Iraq's control over Kuwait's oil, but did not mention Iraq's unconventional
weapons capability. See James Baker, America's Stake in the Persian Gulf, 1 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 69
(1990). However, finding strong public support for a tough non-proliferation approach toward Iraq, the
Bush administration altered its strategy and identified Iraq's unconventional weapons capability as the
preeminent danger. See James Baker, Why America Is in the Gulf, 1 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 235 (1990);
McGeorge Bundy, Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1991, at 83, 89.
5. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 678]. Resolution 678 required Iraq to comply with Security Council Resolution 660,
which simply demanded that Iraq "withdraw immediately and unconditionally" from Kuwaiti territory.
S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. SIRESI660 (1990). While the Bush
administration generally argued that the authorizing language, to "restore international peace and security,"
permitted a forced reduction in Iraq's offensive military capabilities, such a broad interpretation of
Resolution 678 was not uniformly advocated. In Congressional hearings, a senior member of the Bush
administration even admitted that a forced reduction of Iraq's conventional and unconventional military
strength could fall outside of Resolution 678. See U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1990) (statement of James Baker, U.S.
Secretary of State) [hereinafter Gulf Hearings].
6. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1991).
7. Iraq is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signature July
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970), and to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S.
163 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975).
8. When Resolution 678 was adopted, only the use of chemical weapons was prohibited by
international law. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. The
Chemical Weapons Convention was only opened for signature on January 13, 1993, and as of this writing,
Iraq has not yet become party to it. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800
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Council's blanket demand that Iraq be prohibited from manufacturing weapons
of mass destruction, regardless of Iraq's actual international legal obligations,
provided an ex post facto stamp of approval of the American raid on
Tuwaitha.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, scholars and diplomats are left with a
critical question: has the Security Council, by omission and commission,
ushered in a new world order, an order where "coercive arms control" is both
a legal and legitimate instrument of statecraft? By "coercive arms control,"
I mean the use or threatened use of military force (as opposed to other types
of diplomatic measures or economic sanctions) to either eliminate or restrict
the production or deployment of certain classes of weapon systems.9
The starting point in finding an answer to this question is Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter, which requires all members of the United Nations to
"refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.""l Its drafters
[hereinafter CWC].
In regard to ballistic missiles, the only relevant international law is the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), which merely seeks to control the export of long-range (more than 300 kilometers)
ballistic missile equipment and technology. See Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment
and Technology Related to Missiles, Exchange of Letters Between Canada, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States, Apr. 7, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 599. The seven
original members of the MTCR have been joined by Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and Spain. Argentina, the
People's Republic of China, Israel, and Russia have agreed to apply MTCR standards in the export of
missile technology.
9. The concept of coercive arms control clearly predates the Gulf War. See Rex J. Zedalis, On the
Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other
Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 73 (1985). However, the term itself was only
recently introduced to the international law community by Professors Lewis and Joyner. See William H.
Lewis & Christopher C. Joyner, Proliferation of Unconventional Weapons: The Case for Coercive Ans
Control, 10 COMP. STRATEGY 306, 306-08 (1991).
Coercive arms control can be distinguished from "preemptive war" and "preventive war."
Preemptive war is initiated in response to the threat of an attack that is perceived to be imminent. As one
political scientist puts it, "the choice is between war right now and war in the immediate future, between
a war one's own state starts and a war the other side initiates." ROBERT JERVIS, THE MEANING OF THE
NUCLEAR REVOLUTION 137 (1989). A classic example of a preemptive war is the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
See infra part lII.B.2.a. Preventive war is a strategic response to a perceived long-range threat. Historian
Michael Howard has observed that the causes of preventive war are "rooted ... in perceptions by
statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears for the restriction, if not extinction, of their own."
MICHAEL HOWARD, THE CAUSES OF WARS AND OTHER ESSAYS 18 (1983). The preeminent example of
a preventive war is the Peloponnesian War, which broke out because Sparta feared the rising power of
Athens. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 49 (Rex Warner trans., 1954) ("What made
war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.").
In contrast, coercive arms control is characterized by the use of military force directed solely at the
targeted state's deployed forces or production capabilities. Needless to say, an act of coercive arms control
could certainly lead to a wider use of force, including full-scale war, but that is not its political objective.
While an act of coercive arms control may share some of the same concerns that lie behind a decision for
preventive war, its aims and the means employed are much more limited. Thus, what distinguishes
coercive arms control from preventive war is a focused, discrete use of force for a limited set of political
objectives.
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. Article 2(4), in its concern with the use or threatened use of force,
goes well beyond the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which only outlawed "war." Treaty for the Renunciation
of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. For more on the
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permitted only two exceptions to this prohibition on the recourse to military
action:" use of force authorized by the Security Council,"2 or use of force
in self-defense.' 3 Article 2(4) sets guidelines for states on the use of force
against other states, whether under conditions of war or under other scenarios.
Despite the considerable scholarly debate surrounding Article 2(4),14 this
Essay assumes that it is still good law. The principal reason for such an
assumption is that Article 2(4) provides the strictest standard for determining
the legality of coercive arms control. If coercive arms control is legal under
the explicit terms of Article 2(4) and its exceptions, then it will certainly be
legal under a more permissive regime regarding the use of force.'5
This Essay argues that coercive arms control is legal and has been legal
since the 1960s under either exception to the U.N. Charter's prohibition on
the use of force. Part I addresses the exception allowing the collective
exercise of coercive arms control under the U.N. Charter. It examines the
theory underlying this exception in Section A, the operation of the exception
in practice in Section B, the Gulf War as a legal precedent for coercive arms
control under the exception in Section C, and the use of the Gulf War as a
meaningful legal precedent for coercive arms control under the exception in
Section D. Part II concludes by assessing the potential for future coercive
arms control actions. Part III addresses coercive arms control under the self-
defense exception to the U.N. Charter. Its organization mirrors that of Part
II. This Essay concludes that the significance of Resolution 678 is not that it
legitimized the Security Council's power to find a state's military capability
a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council already had
such broad discretionary power under the Charter. Rather, Resolution 678
signifies that states now have the authority to engage in coercive arms control
with only the most minimal requirements.
Kellogg-Briand Pact, see Quincy Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 39 (1933).
11. Technically, there are two other exceptions. First, Article 106 allowed the current five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council to take joint military action prior to the establishment of the
Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 106. Second, under Articles 53 and 107, states are permitted to take
actions against "any enemy state" of the Second World War. Id. arts. 53, 107.
12. Id. art. 42.
13. Id. art. 51.
14. See, e.g., Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the Use of
Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970); Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4)
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971). For an excellent survey and analysis of the
various scholarly positions on Article 2(4), see Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse
to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Arend, Shift in Paradigms].
15. See Arend, Shift in Paradigms, supra note 14, at 6-37 (arguing that Article 2(4) is no longer
authoritative or controlling as international law, and that Article 2(4) has been replaced by more permissive
"post-Charter self-help paradigm" on use of force, which permits military action to carry out just reprisals,
correct past injustices, or promote self-determination).
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II. COERCIVE ARMS CONTROL UNDER THE CHARTER'S EXCEPTION FOR
UNITED NATIONS-SANCTIONED ACTIONS
Part II of this Essay examines the theory of collective security embedded
in the U.N. Charter and of state practice as it has evolved in the four decades
between the Korean War and the Gulf War. The weight of evidence favors the
conclusion that Resolution 678 was consistent with procedures established in
the Charter and was, therefore, legal as a collective exercise of coercive arms
control. However, this Part concludes that Resolution 678 is not a meaningful
precedent for future action because of the unique circumstances under which
it was adopted and because of the United Nations' institutional weakness.
A. The U.N. Charter and Collective Security in Theory
It has been asserted that the "U.N. Security Council has both the judicial
authority and moral suasion to sanction the elimination of doomsday weapons
in the hands of irresponsible members of the international community."16
Certainly, the expansive language of Article 1 of the Charter implicitly
recognizes a legal authority theoretically broad enough to embrace coercive
arms control. Article 1 states that the United Nations' fundamental purpose
is "[to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace. 
"17
Chapter VII of the Charter specifies how the United Nations is to exercise
this broad authority.'" Article 39 provides:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security.' 9
Article 39 is a grant of wide discretionary power to the Security Council. The
drafters of the Charter did not offer precise definitions as to what constitutes
a "threat to the peace," a "breach of the peace," or an "act of aggression. "20
Although the U.N. General Assembly eventually reached a rather limited
definition of aggression,2' the Security Council is not bound by it. Indeed,
16. Lewis & Joyner, supra note 9, at 306.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1; id. art. 24, 1 (granting the Security Council "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security").
18. Id. arts. 39-51.
19. Id. art. 39.
20. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 295 (3d ed. 1969).
21. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Article 1 of the Annex to Resolution 3314 defines aggression as "the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
1994]
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given the history of the Security Council, one strongly suspects that any
definition these terms might have is entirely subjective. To date, the Security
Council has yet to identify a single "act of aggression."' Even in the case
of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the closest the Council came to identifying an
"act of aggression" was in Resolution 667, which strongly condemned the
"aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel
in Kuwait."' The invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait, however,
were not branded "acts of aggression."
The organizational ethos guiding the Security Council is the peaceful
resolution of disputes. Consequently, once the Security Council has identified
a threat to international peace and security, Article 41 of the Charter places
at its disposal the widest possible array of non-military sanctions to encourage
an end to the crisis.4 If the Council deems sanctions available under Article
41 to be insufficient, it may order military sanctions under Article 42.'
Under Article 40, it may also take "provisional measures. "26
In short, the Security Council is granted powers theoretically expansive
enough to identify the development, production, and deployment of certain
weapon systems as a threat to international peace and security, and respond
in whatever manner it deems appropriate.
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations." Id. In addition, Article 3 lists specific acts, such as
invasion, bombardment, and blockade, that constitute "aggression."
22. GOODRICH, supra note 20, at 299 (discussing reluctance of Security Council to find act of
aggression in Korean War). It took the Security Council seven years before it considered the Iran-Iraq War
a breach of the peace sufficient to warrant consideration under Chapter VII of the Charter. Resolution 598
deplored the continuation of the conflict, as well as the use of chemical weapons, and demanded an
immediate ceasefire along with the withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized borders. S.C.
Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, 42nd Sess., 2750th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (1987).
23. S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990).
24. Article 41 reads:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
25. Article 42 provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
of the United Nations.
Id. art. 42. As with Article 41 sanctions, actions mandated by the Security Council under Article 42 are
binding on member states. See id. art. 48.
26. Article 40 provides:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or
position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to
comply with such provisional measures.
Id. art. 40.
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B. The U.N. Charter and Collective Security in Practice
Despite its broad mandate for ensuring international security, the Security
Council was handicapped almost from its first days by the great power rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Deadlocked by the frequent
use of the veto power,27 the Security Council was frozen into a powerless
"adolescence."2" Even the formal mechanisms by which the Security Council
was to impose military sanctions fell victim to the Cold War. The negotiations
over implementation of Article 43, under which U.N. members were to
conclude special arrangements with the Security Council to furnish military
contingents for Council use, broke down in 1947.29 The Military Staff
Committee, which was to coordinate the use of such forces,30 itself amounted
to a hollow shell and met "only as a matter of form." 3" In fact, prior to the
Gulf War, the Security Council authorized the use of military force only once,
during the early days of the Korean War.32
In late June and early July of 1950, the Security Council passed three
resolutions that committed the United Nations to war on the Korean peninsula.
The most important of these actions was Resolution 83, which recommended
that member states render assistance to South Korea in order to repel North
Korea's armed attack and to restore peace. Although Resolution 83 was the
sole precedent for collective coercive arms control prior to Resolution 678,
it was a notable precedent; it confirmed the broad discretion granted to the
Security Council or to states acting under Security Council authority.
The language of Resolution 83 prefigured quite closely the language used
to authorize military action against Iraq in Resolution 678. Resolution 83
recommended that member states "furnish such assistance to the Republic of
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area. "33 More important, as with Iraq
forty years later, the language of the authorizing resolution permitted an
extensive air campaign that went well beyond the minimum force necessary
to "repel the armed attack." As with the later air campaign against Iraq, a
host of economic targets was attacked in North Korea. Bridges, railroad
marshalling yards, and tunnels were struck; manufacturing facilities,
hydroelectric power plants, oil refineries, and communication centers were
also bombed. 4 Virtually anything that could conceivably aid the North
27. Id. art. 27, 3 (requiring all Security Council decisions "be made by an affirmative vote of nine
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members").
28. See generally RICHARD HisCocKs, THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A STUDY IN ADOLESCENCE (1973).
29. GOODRICH, supra note 20, at 319-24.
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, 3.
31. GOODRICH, supra note 20, at 324.
32. See Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: Collective Measures Against Aggression, 1953 INT'L
CONCILIATION 131.
33. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. 5/1511 (1950).
34. See ROBERT F. FUTRELL, THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA, 1950-1953, at 174-79,
480-83 (1961).
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Korean (and later Chinese) war effort was targeted, as sometimes were things
that could not.35
In short, when the Security Council has authorized military action to
restore international peace and security, it has allowed member states to
interpret that authority broadly. Yet, even though Resolution 678 may be
consistent in its effects with Resolution 83, two questions remain: (1) did
Resolution 678 set a legal precedent for more explicit coercive arms control
actions in the future? and (2) if so, did it set a meaningful precedent?
C. The Gulf War: Legal Precedent for Coercive Arms Control?
It has been argued that, at worst, Resolution 678 exceeded the Security
Council's powers under Chapter VII of the Charter,36 and at best, Resolution
678 was technically consistent with Chapter VII but legally questionable.
7
Criticisms of Resolution 678 center around two central issues: (1) whether the
Security Council moved too quickly to authorize military action, and (2)
whether the Security Council delegated too much control over the eventual use
of military force.38 As it will be seen, neither criticism is a serious challenge
to Resolution 678's legality.
1. Resolution 678: Too Much, Too Soon?
The issue of whether the Security Council moved too quickly concerns the
connection between Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. As noted above,39 the
Chapter VII formula requires, first, a determination that a breach has occurred
under Article 39. Once the Security Council has determined that a breach has
35. One chemical complex in particular was targeted, not because it could aid North Koreans, but
because it was believed to be supplying radioactive materials for the Soviet atomic energy program. id.
at 177 (describing General Douglas MacArthur's authorization of "special missions" against Hungnam
chemical complex in July 1950).
36. John Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order
or Disorder?, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 19-20 (1992).
37. Bums H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making:
Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
38. China's abstention creates another issue relating to its legality. In non-procedural issues, Security
Council decisions must be taken "by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes
of the permanent members." U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3. An examination of Article 27's drafting history
indicates that the permanent members believed a voluntary abstention would constitute a veto. See Doc.
852, 1II/1/37, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 710, 713 (1945); Hans Kelsen, Organization and Procedure of the
Security Council of the United Nations, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1087, 1098 (1946). Consequently, it has been
argued that China's voluntary abstention effectively invalidated Resolution 678. Shaw J. Dallal,
International Law and the United Nations'Role in the Gulf Crisis, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 111,
134 (1992). Under rules of treaty interpretation, however, if the text of the treaty is not explicit, one
should take into account any practice of the party states "which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 692 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). The
practice of the Security Council has been to consider a resolution adopted if it gains the requisite majority
and no permanent member votes against it. See GOODRICH, supra note 20, at 230-31. Therefore, China's
abstention poses no real challenge to the legality of Resolution 678.
39. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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occurred, it must either take non-military measures under Article 41, or it
must determine that such measures would be inadequate and then take any
necessary military measures under Article 42." If the Council proceeds
down the route of non-military measures first, as happened with Iraq, when
can the Council invoke Article 42 and authorize military measures?
By the clear language of Article 42, the Council must "consider" that the
non-military measures "would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate"4" in order to move to military measures. Is this a mere technical
requirement or is something substantive required? Although Resolution 678
did not explicitly state that the Security Council had found the Article 41
measures inadequate, such a finding may reasonably be inferred from the very
purpose of Resolution 678.42 Consequently, the issue is not whether the
Security Council made a technical "finding." Nor is the issue whether
economic sanctions would have eventually been successful in forcing Iraq
from Kuwait, since the language of Article 42 does not require actual
exhaustion of non-military measures. Rather the issue is whether the Security
Council waited long enough to determine that economic sanctions would be
inadequate.
Article 33 of the Charter calls for the settlement of interstate disputes first
by "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice." 4" The connection between Articles 41 and 42,
40. See, e.g., Doc. 881, 111/3/46, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 502, 508 (1945) (report of Rapporteur Paul-
Bancour) (stating that drafting committee adopted language "which gives to the Council the power, when
diplomatic, economic, or other measures are considered by the Council to be inadequate, to undertake such
aerial, naval, or other operations as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security").
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
42. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 462
(1991) ("[lI]t is not unreasonable to infer that the Council decision authorizing the cooperating states to use
force ... impliedly recognized that sanctions would not prove adequate to compel Iraqi withdrawal.");
see also Christopher John Sabec, Note, The Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the
International Legal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 63, 99 (1991)
(stating that call for action in Resolution 678 after January 15, 1991 "appears to be a statement that the
Council considered non-military measures to have proved inadequate"). But see Quigley, supra note 36,
at 23 (arguing that "Council's failure to base military action on a [formal] determination that Article 41
measures had failed violated the Chapter VII procedures and rendered its implicit call for military
measures unlawful").
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 33; see also id. art. 2, 3 ("All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered."). Professor John Quigley has suggested that, given the strong emphasis on peaceful dispute
resolution in the Charter, the Council proceeded too quickly to military sanctions without having pursued
adequately a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Quigley, supra note 36, at 20-21. In its first action
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council called on both countries to begin immediate
negotiations. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. SIRES/660 (1990).
According to Professor Quigley, however, "After making this initial invitation ... the Council did not
return to the subject in later resolutions and did nothing to bring about such negotiations." Quigley, supra
note 36, at 21. Consequently, "the Council was on weak ground in proceeding to sanctions." Id. A
rebuttal to Professor Quigley's argument can be found in the comments of British Foreign Secretary
Douglas Hurd, who compared President Saddam Hussein's negotiating tactics with those of a thief, and
doubted that the talks between U.N. Secretary-General Javier PWrez de Cu~llar and Iraqi Foreign Minister
1994]
464 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19: 455
read in light of Article 33's admonition to exhaust all peaceful means of
dispute resolution, suggests that having started down the Article 41 path, the
Security Council was obliged to give sanctions a reasonable chance to work.
This obligation for patience was particularly strong in the case of Iraq. First,
the sanctions against Iraq were unprecedented in their complexity and
comprehensiveness.' Second, Iraq was particularly vulnerable to sanctions
because of its dependence on oil exports and imports of most industrial
goods.4' Third, such quick action with respect to Iraq stood in stark contrast
to the Security Council's prior patience when economic sanctions were applied
in other situations that threatened international peace and security, most
notably against Rhodesia and South Africa." Finally, given the nature of
sanctions, it takes time for even the most vulnerable of target countries to feel
the effects.47 Since only four months had passed between the imposition of
sanctions and the passage of Resolution 678, 48 it could be argued that the
Security Council violated an implicit, but substantive, requirement of the
Charter by authorizing military force too quickly.
Other language in the Charter rebuts this assertion. Resolution 678 may
not have been entirely consistent with the spirit of Article 33, which
encourages negotiation and mandates an exhaustion of peaceful remedies, but
it was entirely consistent with the Charter's fundamental purposes. Article I
of the Charter calls for the maintenance of international peace and security
Tariq Aziz would be successfil. Andrew McEwen, Britain Dismisses Diplomatic Peace Efforts as
Premature, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 31, 1990, at 2.
44. Editorial, Choose Peace, 251 NATION 809 (1990) [hereinafter Choose Peace]; see also Gulf
Hearings, supra note 5, at 121 ("All the evidence indicates that the world embargo against Kuwait is the
most comprehensive in history.") (statement by Joseph Biden, U.S. Senator, quoting former Under
Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Brian E. Urquhart); id. at 124 ("We have 4 months of the
best sanctions enforcement that has ever probably existed.") (statement of James Baker, Secretary of
State).
45. Choose Peace, supra note 44, at 809. Urquhart's views were prefigured by two former chairmen
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, on November. 28, 1990, just one day before Resolution 678 was
approved, counseled patience to the Bush administration. See Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S.
Policy Options and Implications: Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Comm., 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 182-257 (1990) (testimonies of General David C. Jones and Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.). The
views of Jones and Crowe were reportedly shared by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin
Powell. BoB WOODwARD, THE COMMANDERS 38-42 (1991).
46. This very point was brought to the Security Council's attention by the representative from
Yemen, who observed that "it is a little surprising that those who used to lecture us on the need to be
patient for sanctions to work when they had to do with Rhodesia or South Africa are today in such a hurry
to declare that those comprehensive and enforceable sanctions imposed on Iraq are simply not working."
Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 36, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2963 (1990).
In 1966, the Security Council imposed sanctions on Rhodesia after declaring under Chapter VII that
"the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitute a threat to international peace and security." S.C.
Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. SIRESI232 (1966). Three years earlier,
the Security Council imposed sanctions on South Africa after finding that "the situation in South Africa
is seriously disturbing international peace and security." S.C. Res. 181, U.N. SCOR, 18th Sess., 1056
mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/5386 (1963).
47. See Gary C. Hufbauer & Kimberly A. Elliott, Sanctions Will Bite - And Soon, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1991, at A17.
48. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. SIRES/661 (1990); see
also Mideast Tension: Text of U.N. Resolution on Using Force in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990,
at A10.
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through "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace."" 9 Moreover, the preamble refers to saving "succeeding
generations from the scourge of war," and the need to avoid armed force,
"save in the common interest."5" In short, under the Charter's hierarchy of
values, the effective removal of threats to peace takes precedence over the
exhaustion of peaceful remedies in dispute resolution. 1 Because threats to
peace vary, the Council is empowered to respond at its discretion. Thus, the
Security Council is empowered to take effective collective measures to restore
international peace without waiting for peaceful resolutions to work. The
Security Council was under no explicit or implicit obligation to wait to see if
sanctions would force Iraq from Kuwait.
2. Resolution 678: Too Much Delegation?
Another, less ambiguous, legal problem casts a shadow on Resolution
678. Unlike Article 41, which provides that the Council "may call upon the
Members" to apply non-military sanctions, Article 42 states that the Council
"may take such action ... as may be necessary."52 When this language is
joined with the provisions under Articles 43 and 47, which allow for national
contingents to be assigned to the Security Council and for a Military Staff
Committee to be established, the clear implication is that the Security Council,
not individual states, should organize and control any military action under
Article 42. It is this element of control that separates the Charter from its
predecessor, the Covenant of the League of Nations.'
Although the provisions of Article 43 remain unfulfilled,5 in the past,
the Security Council at least attempted to conform to Chapter VII provisions
regarding the use of military force. In Korea, the Security Council established
a U.N. command, 5 although the command was delegated to the United
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
50. Id. pmbl. 1, 7.
51. Some scholars even argue that the maintenance of peace takes priority over the pursuit of
"justice." Professor Arend, assessing the intent of the Charter's drafters, notes:
Although justice - the promotion of human rights, the encouragement of self-determination,
the rectification of economic problems, the correction of past wrongs, and the equitable
resolution of a host of other problems - [was] a goal of the United Nations, it simply was not
to be sought at the expense of peace.
Arend, Shift in Paradigms, supra note 14, at 5-6; see also D.W. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-55 (1958) (identifying peace as United Nations' "paramount" purpose).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
53. The League Council could only make a recommendation to member states on the degree of force
to use in response to aggression. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16, 2; see also GOODRICH, supra
note 20, at 315.
54. Under the express terms of Article 106, the operation of Article 42 is dependent on the existence
of Article 43 forces. While this may suggest that Article 42 is a dead letter, Article 42 may, and has been,
relied upon. As Professor Oscar Schachter has pointed out, "no explicit language in Article 42 or in
Articles 43, 44, and 45 ... precludes states from voluntarily making armed forces available to [the United
Nations] to carry out the resolutions of the Council adopted under chapter VII." Schachter, supra note 42,
at 464.
55. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/Rev. 1 (1950).
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States. The Security Council did not retain even this degree of control in
Resolution 678. The Resolution ignored the Military Staff Committee, despite
a call for its use from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.5 6 Such non-
compliance with Chapter VII procedures led Secretary-General P6rez de
Cu6llar to remark that the Persian Gulf War was not "a classic United Nations
war in the sense that there is no United Nations control of the operations, no
United Nations flag, [no] blue helmets.... The [Security] Council, which
has authorised all this, is informed only after the military actions have taken
place.""' According to one observer, the "absence of Security Council
control violated the requirements of Chapter VII."58
Assuming that a violation did occur, does this violation render Resolution
678 illegal, or at least void, for the purposes of establishing a precedent for
coercive arms control? Law, logic, and the legislative history of the Charter
argue that it does not. The central premise underpinning this challenge to
Resolution 678's legality is that the U.N. Charter is a static, unchanging, and
largely unchangeable document.59 This assumption runs contrary to the
central tenets of international law. While the Statute of the International Court
of Justice gives preference in its hierarchy of sources of international law to
"international conventions,"" ° none of its provisions restricts any change in
the operation or interpretation of a particular treaty to those changes made by
formal amendment. Indeed, not only is "international custom" an independent
source of international law that may supersede international agreements,6t it
may be used in the interpretation of treaties.6 2 In short, recognition that
international law is formed by both the written word and the action of states
is an acknowledgement of the inevitability of change.
56. Frank J. Prial, Crisis Breathes Life into a Moribund U.N. Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1990,
at A20. Gorbachev had once before called for a revival of the Military Staff Committee. Paul Lewis,
SovietAnnounces Shift on U.N. Staff Demanded by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1988, at Al. The Military
Staff Committee did meet shortly after sanctions were imposed. Paul Lewis, Confrontation in the Gulf:
Security Council's Military Panel Reviews Naval Efforts to Enforce Trade Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1990, at All. However, as with the actual war, the Committee played no role in coordinating the
blockade. The failure to revive the Military StaffCommittee for the war against Iraq was sharply criticized
by a former U.N. senior official. Brian Urquhart, Learning from the Gulf, N.Y. REV., Mar. 7, 1991, at
34.
57. Leonard Doyle, Crisis in the Gulf War: UN "Has No Role in Running War, "THE INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 11, 1991, at2.
58. Quigley, supra note 36, at 28.
59. The U.N. Charter, like the U.S. Constitution, can be interpreted as an evolving, ever more
revealing document. Of course, considerable scholarly debate exists about whether the U.S. Constitution
should in fact be seen as a dynamic document. The "originalist" school of constitutional thought argues
that the Supreme Court should not be in the business of constructing new rights, but instead should simply
determine the original intent of the framers. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1984); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 455 (1986); Edwin Meese, III, Address, Construing the Constitution,
19 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 22 (1985).
60. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)(a).
61. See id. art. 38(1)(b) (listing "international custom" as source of international law).
62. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, art. 31, 3 (taking parties'
"practice[s]" into account in interpreting treaties).
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The organs of the United Nations must adapt to changing circumstances.
The Security Council may not always need to make formal determinations that
Article 41 sanctions have been proven to be inadequate to invoke Article 42,
or to exercise direct control over Article 42 enforcement actions. What may
seem like "violations" can easily be seen under a different light as necessary
and logical adaptations to a changing environment. 3 At least one observer
critical of Resolution 678's legality concedes that the resolution may constitute
an entirely new and positive precedent in the United Nations' police action
procedures: "[F]rom a perspective that welcomes strengthened UN policing
opportunities and capabilities, including a Security Council positioned to act
quickly and effectively, [the precedent of Resolution 678] may, if wisely fine
tuned, prove salutary over the long run. "64
Indeed, such an evolution would bring the Charter closer to the original
intent of the drafters. The President of the United Nations Charter Preparatory
Commission noted in 1945 that there was "general agreement as to the
paramount importance of the Security Council being placed in a position to act
quickly and effectively. "65 He further added that "on the authority and ability
of the Security Council to act with all possible dispatch and forcefulness, may
very well depend at some future date, the security, the peace, and the very
existence of the freedom- and justice-loving nations of the world. "66
Moreover, the mere fact that the United States decided to act on the basis
of Article 39, rather than on the self-defense provisions of Article 51, can be
seen as an important affirmation of Resolution 678, and more broadly of
Article 2(4).7 If Resolution 678 can be seen as an acceptable modification
of the Security Council's procedures, why can it also not be seen as an
acceptable expansion of the Council's scope of action to include coercive arms
control? The notion that the Charter is an organic treaty with expandable
63. See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign
Relations: U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 66
(1991) ("Failure to implement Article 43 merely led to organic growth and the alternative creation of
police action through [the] invocation of Article 42, which does not require special agreements.").
64. Weston, supra note 37, at 522 (footnote omitted). While Weston questions Resolution 678's
legitimacy, he does not conclude that it was illegal. Id. at 533.
65. Doc. 943, 11115, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 13 (1945). For similar language about the need for the
Security Council to act quickly, see id. at 12-13; Doc. 881, 111/3/46, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 502, 503
(1945).
66. Doc. 943, 111/5, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 13 (1945).
67. As Professor Paul Kahn has noted:
From the perspective of creating an effective international legal regime [regulating the use of
force], the United States' action with respect to Iraq is particularly praiseworthy because a
strong argument could be made in support of unilateral action under Article 51 of the
Charter.... Arguably, the United States could have defended Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
merely upon request from their governments. This exception for a unilateral recourse to force
in "self-defense" has provided a large loophole through which much of the hope for the
prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) has fallen over the last few decades. Yet another
unilateral use of force, justified by reference to Article 51, would have done little to advance
international law from self-serving rhetorical system to an actual restraint on the behavior of
states.
Paul W. Kahn, Lessonsfor International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L. REV. 425, 431 (1993).
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functions is embedded in international law. In Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, the International Court of Justice held that the U.N. General
Assembly had the authority to develop and incur costs for peacekeeping forces
even though such forces were not explicitly authorized in the Charter.68 As
Judge Spender argued in that case,
A general rule is that words used in a treaty should be read as having the meaning they bore
therein when it came into existence. But this meaning must be consistent with the purposes
sought to be achieved. Where, as in the case of the Charter, the purposes are directed to
saving succeeding generations in an indefinite future from the scourge of war, ... the
general rule above stated does not mean that the words in the Charter can only comprehend
such situations and contingencies and manifestations of subject-matter as were within the
minds of the framers of the Charter.6 '
In logic reminiscent of Justice Marshall's in McCulloch v. Maryland,7' Judge
Spender was articulating a doctrine of implied powers. Through such a
doctrine, the United Nations can exercise implied powers in order to
implement the purposes and functions of the organization as spelled out in the
Charter.71
Since the Charter was drafted and signed before Hiroshima, it is, to use
John Foster Dulles' words, "a pre-atomic age charter."72 Given the
tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons, no one is likely to argue
that the proliferation of such weapons should not fall within the purview of the
Security Council simply because nuclear weapons were not known to the
Charter's drafters. This conclusion raises the organizing question of this
Essay: are there circumstances under which a state or states can legally use
force to respond to the development, production, deployment, or threatened
use of unconventional weapons, such as nuclear weapons?
Resolution 678 answers this question affirmatively. If it is accepted that
Resolution 678 was a legal exercise of the Security Council's evolving
authority, then it is but a short step to the conclusion that the American strike
on Tuwaitha was consistent with Resolution 678. Resolution 678 authorized
the United States and its coalition partners to use "all necessary means" to
ensure Iraqi withdrawal and to "restore international peace and security in the
area."'a It requires very little imagination to see how reducing or destroying
Iraq's nuclear weapons infrastructure would contribute to international peace
and security in the Gulf region. Unlike the U.S. Air Force's strikes against
retreating Iraqis in the last stages of the war, which were marked by
gratuitous damage and loss of life, the strike at Tuwaitha cannot be
68. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 163 (Advisory Op. of July 20).
69. Id. at 186 (separate opinion of Spender, J.).
70. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
71. See D.W. BowErr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTrrtTIONs 337-38 (4th ed. 1982).
72. John Foster Dulles, U.S. Constitution and U.N. Charter: An Appraisal, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL.
307, 310 (1953), quoted in ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
UsE OF FORCE 39 (1993).
73. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 5.
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condemned as inconsistent with Resolution 678.' 4 The strike against
Tuwaitha came early in the war, less than a week after the air war began, and
was apparently discriminate and proportional in its methods.75
Although a persuasive case can be made that Resolution 678 was a legal
exercise of Security Council authority, a nagging question remains. In almost
every area of substantive law some decisions, while never overturned, have
been so extensively criticized and distinguished by subsequent decisions or are
so tied to a particular set of facts that they cannot be said to offer any
meaningful precedent. Consequently, it must be asked, how meaningful is
Resolution 678 for future efforts at coercive arms control?
D. The Gulf War: Meaningful Legal Precedent for Coercive Arms Control?
By definition, a precedent is meaningful if it can encourage and guide
similar action in the future. Under international law, an event can only
encourage and guide future action if it possesses two elements: authority and
control.76 First, it must be perceived by states to be authoritative,77 as
possessing legitimacy.78 Second, the rule must be reflected in state behavior;
it must be controlling.79 As Professors McDougal and Lasswell explain,
"The conjunction of common expectations concerning authority with a high
degree of corroboration in actual operation is what we understand by law."8"
While a persuasive case can be made that Resolution 678 has authority, there
are strong reasons to doubt whether it will ever be controlling. Two sets of
reasons make it unlikely that Resolution 678 will serve as precedent for
coercive arms control in the future. The first set concerns the uniqueness of
the Gulf War. The second concerns the weaknesses of the United Nations as
an institution.
1. Uniqueness of the Gulf War
The Gulf War was unique in at least five key aspects. The first was the
triggering event. In 1990, as in 1950, what triggered a Security Council
74. Quigley, supra note 36, at 15.
75. Defense Department Centcom Briefing, Fed. News Service, Jan. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Fednew File.
76. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
77. According to McDougal and Lasswell, "Authority is the structure of expectation concerning who,
with what qualifications and mode of selection, is competent to make which decisions by what criteria and
what procedures." Id. at 9.
78. See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (defining
legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance
on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe the rule or institution has come into being
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process").
79. McDougal and Lasswell explain that "[bly control we refer to an effective voice in decision,
whether authorized or not." McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 76, at 9.
80. Id.
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resolution authorizing the use of force was a brutal and utterly transparent act
of aggression. Given the possibility of one state dominating the supply of oil
from the Persian Gulf, the invasion of Kuwait was a particularly galvanizing
act of aggression.8 ' Indeed, as four noted analysts observed, "One is hard
pressed to recall a more unambiguous act of aggression that was so pregnant
with dark possibilities by a large state against a small neighbor."8 " Such an
egregious triggering event is unlikely in the future. Moreover, requiring such
a trigger would defeat the implicit purpose of coercive arms control: to
prevent an act of aggression. For coercive arms control to be effective, the
use of force must be authorized before an act of aggression occurs. Yet such
pre-aggression authorization is unlikely given the Security Council's history
of using the reactive, rather than proactive, approach.
Second, in 1990 the Security Council was incredibly lucky in its draw of
an opponent: "It is hard to imagine a more clumsy or cynical villain" than
Saddam Hussein. 3 By taking hostage French diplomats and citizens from
Kuwait, for example, Hussein assured French military participation in the
campaign to drive Iraq from Kuwait. 4 France otherwise might not have
participated in the military coalition given its large Arab population and
tradition of strategic individualism. Since coercive arms control is inherently
a preventive action, there will typically not be an aggressive act around which
to organize a collective response. There will also be no assurance of a single
individual, let alone an inept one, who can be easily vilified to mobilize
international and domestic support.
Third, as in 1950, the passage of a Security Council resolution
authorizing military force was facilitated by events external to the crisis at
hand. In 1950, it was the absence of the Soviet delegate, who was protesting
the Security Council's refusal to seat the delegate from Beijing as the
representative of China. In 1990, although the delegates from the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China were both present for the debate
81. See Editorial, Is Anyone Really Safe in the Face of Such Aggression?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1990, at B6 ("The aggression was undisguised, the greed was naked, the operation was swift, vengeful
and effective. In just a few hours, Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein wolfed down all of Kuwait and sat back
to gloat.").
82. Bobby R. Inman et al., U.S. Strategy After the Storm, in AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM
THE GULF WAR 267, 267 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Roger K. Smith eds., 1992) [hereinafter AFTER THE
STORM].
83. Id. The same observers remark:
In a bizarre attempt at crisis management just a few days after invading Kuwait, Saddam
Hussein... poured gasoline on the fire he had ignited by detaining foreign nationals as
"guests" of the Iraqi state. Three days after he began to take hostages and four days after he
announced the "eternal merger" between Iraq and its long-lost nineteenth province, Saddam
Hussein cloaked himself in the mantle of Palestinian nationalism by proclaiming that the
resolution of the Kuwait crisis was inextricably linked with the Palestinian cause.
Id.
84. Strobe Talbott, Status Quo Ante: The United States and Its Allies, in AFTER THE STORM, stpra
note 82, at 3, 9-10.
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on Resolution 678, their votes were influenced by other considerations. 5 As
one scholar has remarked, "Both the Soviet Union and China were so
preoccupied with their own domestic problems, and with their relations with
the West, that they were unwilling to exercise their veto power in the U.N.
Security Council to defend a former client state."86 It is unlikely that either
Russia or China will be dealing with events as momentous as the death of
Communist rule or the massacre at Tiananmen Square when a resolution
authorizing coercive arms control next comes before the Council.
Fourth, despite a naked act of aggression with wide-ranging
consequences, a clumsy adversary, and distracted members of the Security
Council, the coalition against Iraq did not come together of its own accord.
The United States had to provide a number of inducements. These
inducements took a number of forms but most involved money. To insure the
dispatch of Egyptian troops to the Saudi desert, the United States canceled
Egypt's foreign military sales debt.87 To insure the votes of the Latin
American and African representatives on the Security Council, the United
States reportedly promised long-sought financial assistance and attention.88
The price for China's abstention was U.S. support for a $114.3 million loan
from the World Bank,89 and the resumption of normal diplomatic ties, which
had been suspended since the Tiananmen crackdown.90 For Yemen, which
voted against Resolution 678, the United States cut off $70 million in annual
aid.9" While the use of carrots and sticks by the United States to pull
together an international coalition was not unprecedented, the extent of the
U.S. campaign was unusual. Few world events are likely to trigger such a
commitment from the United States.
The U.S. inducements to gain Soviet support are particularly instructive.
In order to secure Soviet support, the United States agreed to keep Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania out of the November 1990 Paris summit conference on
European security. In addition, the United States encouraged Saudi Arabia to
provide Moscow with approximately $1 billion of much needed hard
currency.92 While these inducements purchased an affirmative vote on
Resolution 678, they did not buy a completely compliant Soviet Union. The
85. The Soviet Union voted for the resolution, while China abstained. Paul Lewis, Mideast Tensions:
U.N. Gives Iraq Until Jan. 15 to Retreat or Face Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at Al.
86. Kahn, supra note 67, at 433.
87. Memorandum on the Cancellation of Egyptian Military Debt, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1 (Dec. 27, 1990); see also Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Proposal to Forgive Egypt's Foreign Military Sales
Debt, I DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 107, 107-09 (1990).
88. See World News Tonight with Peter Jennings: Report of John McWethy (ABC television
broadcast, Nov. 29, 1990), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCNew File.
89. See Stephen Labaton, World Bank Lends China $114 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at
A13.
90. Thomas L. Friedman, Mideast Tensions: How U.S. Won Support to Use Mideast Forces, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, § 1, at 1.
91. Judith Miller, Kmvait Envoy Says Baker Vowed "No Concessions" to Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
5, 1990, at A22.
92. Friedman, supra note 90, § 1, at 1.
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Soviet Union, in fact, refused to endorse the coalition's highly punitive plans
for Iraq. Moreover, throughout the war, it offered Saddam Hussein terms
much more generous than those offered by the Bush administration.93 The
Soviet Union's independent diplomacy emphasizes an important and timeless
adage in international politics: that two countries have reached an agreement
says nothing about its content. As a consequence, any resolution authorizing
coercive arms control will not materialize spontaneously, but will emerge
from a highly political and visible process. The very visibility of this political
process will alert the targeted state and jeopardize the success of any
subsequent military action.
Finally, one needs to consider the distinctive military factors that ensured
the success of the Gulf War, beginning with the fact that Iraq proved to be the
most compliant of adversaries. As several experts noted,
Saddam Hussein did not attempt to interfere with the coalition's efforts to marshall and train
its forces, to test, adjust, and make fully operational its high-tech weapon systems, and to
work out the command and control links for a coordinated multinational campaign. Not only
did the coalition have the luxury of months of unfettered preparation, but it was also able
to decide when and where the coming battle would be fought. No less rare in the annals of
far-flung military expeditions was a readily available infrastructure (ports, air bases, fuel,
and pre-positioned equipment) to support the deployment of half a million men and
women.9
While future acts of coercive arms control would probably not require a
military force of the magnitude deployed in the Gulf during Operation Desert
Storm, they would probably require participation of more than one state's
military forces. At a minimum, the executing state will most likely need
passive military cooperation of other states in the form of overflight rights,
staging areas, port facilities, and the like. As time goes on, it will most likely
require the active cooperation of several states. The proliferation of advanced
military capabilities, conventional as well as unconventional, means that the
"risks of intervention are escalating substantially." 95 While debate among
Security Council members will make strategic surprise impossible,
proliferation of surveillance and imaging systems will make tactical surprise
less and less likely.96 The proliferation of precision-guided munitions,
particularly cruise missiles, may make successful military interventions the
exception and not the rule.97
93. See Talbott, supra note 84, at 11-21.
94. Inman, supra note 82, at 267-68.
95. Brad Roberts, From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation, 18 INT'L SECURITY 139, 155 (1993).
96. See generally COMMERCIAL OBSERVATION SATELLITES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Michael
Krepon et al. eds., 1990).
97. See W. SETH CARUS, CRUISE MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN THE 1990S (1992). Carus argues that
recent breakthroughs in engine design and navigation technology have placed the production of accurate
cruise missiles within the reach of many developing countries. Given that these weapons systems are well
suited to the delivery of chemical and biological agents, the success of any intervention against a country
armed with such weapons will be increasingly problematic.
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2. Requirements for the Collective Exercise of Coercive Arms Control
Acknowledging the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding
Resolution 678 raises the question of whether a resolution authorizing the
collective exercise of coercive arms control would materialize if there were
no obvious act of aggression, no villain, no state willing and able to assume
the burdens and risks of leadership, and no favorable military situation. Put
differently, what does the United Nations need to change in order to ensure
that collective coercive arms control will be undertaken when needed?
To guard against the vagaries of changing fortune and shifting
international alignments, the United Nations will need to do at least four
things, none of which will be easy. First, the United Nations will need to
increase the scope of its jurisdiction over domestic matters. Under the
Charter, the United Nations is not "to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."" However, there
is an exception to this prohibition: it "shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII [of the Charter]. " In short, the
United Nations can intervene in domestic affairs of any member state when
international peace and security are threatened.
Increasing the United Nations' domestic reach may be the easiest of the
four requirements. In recent years, the precedent for intrusive, multilateral
monitoring of a state's unconventional and conventional military capacity has
become well established. The agreements on intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF), ° conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE),10' strategic nuclear
arms reductions (START 1102 & 1°3), and the chemical weapons
convention"°  all contain elaborate verification provisions, including
sustained on-site monitoring and challenge inspections.
Moreover, over the last few years, the Security Council has demonstrated
a willingness to expand the boundaries of what constitutes a threat to
international peace and security. The most significant expansion of the
Council's international jurisdiction came at the expense of Iraq's sovereignty.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
99. Id.
100. Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles,
Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., arts. X-XIII, S. Treaty Doc. No. 11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988), 27
I.L.M. 90, 94-97 (entered into force May 31, 1988).
101. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, arts. XIII-XV, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 8, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1991), 30 1.L.M. 6, 19-20 (entered into force July 17, 1992).
102. Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
arts. 9-12, S. Treaty Doc. No. 20, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1991); Protocol to the Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 23, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 32, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) (making Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and United States party to
START). The treaty will enter into force when all five countries have ratified the treaty. At present
Belarus and Ukraine have yet to ratify.
103. Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-
Russian Federation, arts. V, S. Treaty Doc. No. 1, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
104. CWC, supra note 8, art. XXI.
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In addition to Resolution 687, with its provisions for the forced disarmament
of Iraq, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which dealt with Iraq's
repression of its Kurdish and Shiite minorities. Resolution 688 condemned the
"repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq," demanded
that Iraq "immediately end this repression," and ordered Iraq to "allow
immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in
need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary
facilities for their operation." 5 The Security Council justified its
intervention on the grounds that Iraq's repressive acts led to a massive influx
of refugees across international frontiers, which threatened international peace
and security in the region."e6 Such action by the Security Council was quite
remarkable. As one scholar observed, "Even though human rights violations
had been condemned before as threats to international peace and security,
Resolution 688 marked the first time that the United Nations ordered a state
to receive humanitarian assistance from international agencies." 7
In the Somalian civil war, the Security Council took another step to
enlarge the scope of actions it may undertake. In late November 1992, the
United States offered to use military force to ensure the delivery of
humanitarian relief to the Somalian people. In early December, the Security
Council unanimously accepted the U.S. offer by adopting Resolution 794."'
It never used the word "force," but clearly implied its use in language
reminiscent of Resolution 678. "[A]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter,"
the Security Council in Resolution 794 "authoriz[ed] the Secretary-General
and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to . . . use all
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia."" ° Unlike Resolutions 678 and 688,
there was no identifiable act of state-sponsored aggression or repression. The
absence of any traditional triggering event bodes well for the collective
exercise of coercive arms control.
There is no assurance, however, that the Security Council will always
define its authority in such broad terms. Despite widespread opposition to the
military coup that overthrew Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide"l0 and
strong action by the Organization of American States,"' the Security
105. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. SlRESl688 (1991).
106. Id.
107. Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations and the New World Order, 81 GEo. L.J. 491, 499
(1993) [hereinafter Arend, New World Order]. Iraq accepted the Security Council's demands less than two
weeks after the adoption of Resolution 688. See Memorandum of Understanding, Apr. 18, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 860.
108. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
109. Id. at 3.
110. See G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 31st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/7 (1991)
(condemning coup and demanding "the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide").
111. Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OEA/Ser.FIV.1, MRE/RES.1/91 Corr.1 (Oct.
3, 1991), reprinted in Letter from the Permanent Representatives of Ecuador and the United States of
America to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/23109 (1991)
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Council refused to take any meaningful action, reportedly due to a concern
that the Security Council is "becoming increasingly involved in domestic
issues that are the private affairs of member states."" 2 More recently, the
Security Council has persistently refused to authorize military action to stop
Serbian aggression in Bosnia or to stop the continued conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
A second, and more difficult, task for the United Nations is to reconcile
a tension in the Charter regarding the United Nations' role in conflict
management. Under Chapter VI of the Charter," 3 the Security Council
performs the role of a neutral party that facilitates the peaceful settlement of
disputes. Under Chapter VII, as discussed earlier," 4 the Security Council
becomes much more of a partisan player - identifying which party is a threat
to international peace and security, and responding with a variety of military
and non-military sanctions.
For most of its history, the United Nations has preferred the neutral role
of "peacekeeper."'5 However, as evidenced by the actions against Iraq, and
more recently, in Somalia, it appears increasingly willing to play the role of
"peacemaker." Coercive arms control will require that the United Nations
play a partisan role to an even greater degree in the management of
international conflicts. If the United Nations chooses the role of peacemaker,
its ability to offer its services as a neutral arbiter might be affected. To carry
out its role as an "honest broker," the United Nations must be perceived as
a "truly disinterested party, rendering decisions based on established legal
norms and entering the process without biases toward any of the
disputants."16 Depending on who are the targets of authorized coercive
arms control and how it is exercised, the United Nations will run the risk of
destroying its reputation of neutrality. If the targets of United
Nations-authorized coercive arms control actions tend to be from one region
or from one end of the ideological/political spectrum, the United Nations will
be seen as the creature of a few powerful states. Yet at the same time, only
a few states are powerful enough to carry out coercive arms control actions
on the United Nations' behalf. Moreover, they are unlikely to conduct such
actions against each other.
The two other obstacles to the U.N. practice of coercive arms control are
closely intertwined. For almost its entire history, the United Nations in
general, and the Security Council in particular, have approached their mission
in a reactive manner. The Gulf crisis illustrates this habit of reaction: the
(recommending suspension of all economic and diplomatic ties with military government in Haiti).
112. Paul Lewis, U.N. Stops Short of Haiti Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at 8.
113. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38.
114. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
115. See A. LEROY BENNET, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES 107-14 (5th
ed. 1988) (identifying 172 disputes that were considered by Security Council or General Assembly in
1946-88).
116. Arend, New World Order, supra note 107, at 504.
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United Nations did nothing until after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Before August 2,
1990, despite the escalating rhetoric, the provocative military deployments,
and the failure of the Arab League to resolve the crisis, the United Nations
took no action." 7 This penchant for responding to crises in an ad hoc
fashion is anathema to coercive arms control with its ethos of prevention.
One reason that the United Nations has been able to practice only
curative, and not preventive, medicine against threats to international peace
and security is its institutional weakness. As noted earlier, the principal
mechanisms for taking preventive action - the Article 43 military contingents
and the Military Staff Committee - have been dormant since the United
Nations' founding. According to some observers, this very weakness was
responsible for the United Nations' poor performance in the Gulf crisis."'
Some have argued that because of this institutional weakness, the United
Nations not only forfeited the initiative during the Gulf crisis, it also forfeited
its independence and neutrality." 9
One of the consequences of the Gulf War has been a deluge of proposals
to make the United Nations more proactive, while at the same time preserving
its independence from the manipulations of dominant states. Central to most
of these proposals is the creation of a permanent U.N. military force that
could be used preventively.12 The concept of such a force has found favor
beyond the editorial pages and academic journals. At the Security Council's
first summit at the level of heads of state and government in January 1992,
five states, including two permanent members (France, Russia, Austria,
117. To be fair, it should be noted that the United Nations was not alone in misreading the signals
coming from Baghdad prior to August 2, 1990. In particular, a great deal of attention has been devoted
to the United States' failings in preventive diplomacy. For one of the most detailed critiques of American
policy, see Paul Gigot, A Great American Screw-Up, NAT'L INTEREST, Winter 1990/91, at 3. In some
accounts of the crisis, the problem was not in reading the signals inaccurately, but in the mindset of those
receiving the information. The director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Harry
E. Soyster, reportedly did not believe one of his analyst's predictions that Iraq would invade Kuwait
because it was inconceivable to him that "Saddam would do something so anachronistic as an old-fashioned
land grab. Countries didn't go around doing things like that anymore." WOODWARD, supra note 45, at
217.
118. Robert C. Johansen, Lessons for Collective Security, 8 WORLD POL'Y J. 561, 563 (1991)
(arguing that one "important" lesson of Gulf War was that "the United Nations was institutionally
unprepared to handle the crisis and its aftermath").
119. Stephen Lewis, A Promise Betrayed, 8 WORLD POL'Y J. 539 (1991) (arguing that because of
United Nations' institutional weakness, it "served as an imprimatur of legitimacy for a policy that the
United States wanted to follow and either persuaded or coerced everybody else to support").
120. See, e.g., Richard N. Gardner, Collective Security and the 'New World Order": What Role for
the United Nations?, in AFTER THE STORM, supra note 82, at 31, 39-47 (arguing for creation of U.N.
"Rapid Deployment Force"); Alan K. Henrikson, How Can the Vision of a "New World Order" Be
Realized?, 16 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 63, 74-77 (1992) (calling for creation of three different U.N.
forces, "Standing Reserve Peace Force," "Rapid Response Peace Force," and "Permanent Peacekeeping
Force"); Brian Urquhart, Who Can Stop Civil Wars, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1991, § 4, at 1 (proposing
U.N. deployment force that could initiate use of force in both intra- and inter-state conflicts); Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., Create a U.N. Fire Brigade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at A21 (advancing formation of 60,000
troop U.N. rapid deployment force, with 5000 troops held for immediate deployment into troubled areas);
David Boren, The World Needs an Army on Call, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1992, at A21 (urging creation
of 100,000 troop U.N. rapid deployment force); Editorial, The New Blue Army, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1992, § 4, at 16; Editorial, A Foreign Legion for the World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1992, at A16.
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Belgium, and Hungary), explicitly endorsed the creation of a U.N. force. 2 '
As a follow-up to the summit, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
published a study detailing how the United Nations could more effectively
ensure international peace and security." One of the most noteworthy
aspects of his An Agenda for Peace was its call for the creation of "peace-
enforcement units" under the command of the Secretary-General." z The
mission of these units, which would be more heavily armed than peacekeeping
forces, "would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual."124
From the Secretary-General's perspective, such an institutional change is
critical to the future role of the United Nations: "[Tihe option of taking
[military action] is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a
guarantor of international security.""z
Like many of the pundits who advocate the creation of an institutionalized
military force for the United Nations, the Secretary-General believes that,
with the end of the Cold War, the time is ripe for fulfillment of Article 43 and
the utilization of the Military Staff Committee. 2 6 But the past is more
complicated than it may first appear. True, Article 43 was a victim of the
Cold War, but it was also a victim of its own inherent ambiguities and
difficulties. As the record of the Military Staff Committee's work in 1946-47
shows, a number of serious, and potentially intractable, problems would
accompany any attempt to create a peace-enforcement army for the United
Nations."7 The same issues that bedeviled the Military Staff Committee in
the late 1940s - command, control, basing, size, and equipment - would
haunt the Security Council today. Of particular importance to effective
coercive arms control is the size and sophistication of the proposed U.N.
force, particularly its naval and air arms. If the force is small and possesses
relatively unsophisticated weapon systems, a double standard may emerge
because such a force would be able to compel adherence to arms control
regimes by small states, but not large ones. If the U.N. force is large and
sophisticated, two dangers emerge. The first is the obvious danger to any
121. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg., at 18, 47, 63, 72, 119, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (prov.
ed. 1992) [hereinafter 3046th Meeting]. Prior to the heads of state summit, a group of small states had
recommended the creation of a permanent U.N. military force under the direct control of the Secretary-
General rather than the Security Council, to protect weaker nations. See Protection and Security of Small
States: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 50, Provisional Agenda Item 69,
U.N. Doc. A/46/339 (1991).
122. An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/471277 (1992)




126. Id. ("Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was
adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer
prevail.").
127. Andrew S. Miller, Note, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and the Legal Alternatives,
81 GEO. L.J. 773, 800-09 (1993) (comparing debates in Military Staff Committee with current proposals
to create U.N. standing force).
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state's sovereignty from such a force. The second is more subtle; if one state
makes a disproportionate contribution to the size and sophistication of the
U.N. force, it may acquire influence over the use of the force commensurate
with its contribution, thereby compromising the United Nations' neutrality.
U.S. and British reaction to the proposals for a permanent force illustrates
the enduring problem of trying to create such an international force. Both
British Prime Minister John Major and President George Bush refrained from
endorsing a permanent force and instead stressed the value of the United
Nations' traditional roles in peacekeeping and in acting as an "honest
broker." 2 ' American reluctance to have an active, interventionist United
Nations was obvious when President Bill Clinton addressed the U.N. General
Assembly in September 1993 and listed a number of institutional changes that
the United States supported in order to make the United Nations more
effective in safeguarding international security; conspicuous by its absence
from that list was any reference to a permanent military force.
129
Other states share the reluctance of the United States and Britain to
expand the mandate of the United Nations. In recent days, the permanent
members of the Security Council have voiced support for a cautious, "go-
slow" approach to U.N. military involvement in international conflicts."o
While it can be argued that Resolution 678 has established a legal
precedent for the collective exercise of coercive arms control, it is much more
difficult to argue that it is an immediately meaningful legal precedent. On
grounds of political and military efficiency, the unilateral or multilateral
exercise of coercive arms control without explicit U.N. sanction is far more
available to the international community. Its legality is the subject of the
discussion in Part mI.
III. COERCIVE ARMS CONTROL UNDER THE CHARTER'S
EXCEPTION FOR SELF-DEFENSE
This Part examines the second exception to the U.N. Charter's prohibition
on the use of force that would permit coercive arms control, the exception
allowing acts in self-defense. Part III begins with a quick overview of the
customary international law on this subject and moves on to determine that the
Charter, in theory and in practice, incorporates this law. It then recounts how
128. See 3046th Meeting, supra note 121, at 2-7, 49-45, 136-47. Subsequent news accounts
confirmed the opposition of American and British officials to a permanent U.N. force. See Paul Lewis,
France's U.N. Plan at Odds with U.S., N.Y. TaiEs, Feb. 2, 1992, § 1, at 7; Robin Oakley & James
Bone, Leaders Hail New World Order, THE TIMEs (London), Feb. 1, 1992, at 1.
129. The U.N. Assembly in Clinton's Words: U.N. Cannot Become Engaged in Every World Conflict,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1993, at 16 ("We support the creation of a genuine U.N. peacekeeping
headquarters with a planning staff, with access to timely intelligence, with a logistics unit that can be
deployed on a moment's notice, and a modem operations center with global communication." (quoting
President Clinton's address to United Nations)).
130. Paul Lewis, 5 Key Nations Urge Prudence in Setting Peacekeeping Goal, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
1, 1993, at A2.
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the Security Council, through its actions during the Six Day War of 1967, the
1981 Israeli raid on Tuwaitha, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, has gradually
enlarged the law's scope to include efforts at coercive arms control. The
discussion then turns to whether the Gulf War can be seen as a legal exercise
of self-defense and coercive arms control. This Part argues that the Gulf War
both met and expanded the scope of coercive arms control permitted without
express U.N. sanction. Moreover, the newly expanded notion of permissible
coercive arms control is being slowly institutionalized in the bureaucratic
organization and diplomatic practice of the United States. This Part concludes
with a cautionary note about the practical obstacles constraining the use of
military force for arms control objectives.
A. Customary International Law and Anticipatory Self-Defense
Coercive arms control, with its ethos of prevention, can be best thought
of as a form of anticipatory self-defense, defined as self-defense that occurs
immediately before the aggressor strikes the first blow.' Anticipatory self-
defense should be distinguished from reprisal. Although both are a form of
self-help, they have different purposes. Reprisals, since they come after an
attack has been absorbed, are punitive in nature and cannot be undertaken for
protection. In contrast, anticipatory self-defense comes before an attack and
is designed to mitigate harm.'32
Hugo Grotius, writing in 1625, acknowledged not only a natural right to
self-defense, but also the need for protection against a present danger and
threatening behavior that is "imminent in point of time."' By recognizing
this need, Grotius implied that self-defense is permitted not only after an
131. Coercive arms control most often takes place well before there is any threat of hostilities, but
it may also occur after hostilities have begun. What distinguishes acts of coercive arms control from other
acts of self-defense are the independent nature of the arms control objectives. In 1991, for example,
American decisionmakers knew that Iraq, although it harbored nuclear ambitions, did not possess a nuclear
weapons capability and would not gain such a capability before the war ended. The 1991 American raid
on Tuwaitha thus had little to do with evicting Iraq from Kuwait and everything to do with limiting Iraqi
power in the future. Because the destruction of the research and production facilities was not directly
related to the primary war effort, the raid is more usefully characterized as an independent act of coercive
arms control than as one act among many related to the prosecution of the war.
132. Anticipatory self-defense is a right that was well recognized under customary international law,
with its origins dating back to ancient Athens and Rome. See Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense
in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a NuclearAge, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1984)
(citing statements by Plato and Cicero recognizing need to forestall imminent or future attack). However,
it was not until after the Renaissance that the principles underlying the right to anticipatory self-defense
were formally acknowledged. In response to the prolonged brutality of the Thirty Years War, a number
of late Enlightenment scholars began to identify the requirements for a just war. See GEOFFREY BEST,
HuMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS
31-74 (1983). At the core of the then-emergingjus ad bellum doctrine was the notion of necessity. It was
this notion that eventually came to underlie the legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. See Derek
Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 394 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985) (discussing distinction between reprisal and self-
defense).
133. Hucso GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] 173
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
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attack has already taken been place, but also in advance. For Grotius, "it is
permissible to kill him who is making ready to kill. " 134
Samuel von Pufendorf and Emmerich de Vattel later echoed Grotius'
basic points. Pufendorf noted an obligation to exhaust all peaceful avenues to
a settlement:
[Where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me, even though
he has not yet revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible self
defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided there be no hope that,
when admonished in afriendly spirit, he may put off his hostile temper... . [F]or defense
it is not required that one receive the first blow, or merely avoid and parry those aimed at
him.' 35
Vattel refined Grotius's summary of the law by stressing that the right
to anticipatory self-defense is contingent on the truly imminent nature of the
attack. According to Vattel,
It is safest to.prevent the evil, when it can be prevented. A nation has a right to resist an
injurious attempt, and to make use of force and every honourable expedient against
whosoever is actually engaged in opposition to her, and even to anticipate his machinations,
observing, however, not to attack him upon vague and uncertain suspicions, lest she should
incur the imputation of becoming herself an unjust aggressor.3 6
Despite the efforts of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, the concept of
anticipatory self-defense remained more of an ex post facto justification for
state action than a legal doctrine. It was not until the Caroline case in 1837
that anticipatory self-defense "was changed from a political excuse to a legal
doctrine. "117
The Caroline case involved an attack by British soldiers on an American
ship in American waters. The attack occurred during the unsuccessful
rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. The rebellion had
attracted sympathy and support in the United States, and the Caroline was
being used to transport supplies to the rebels. On the night of December 29,
after the Caroline had returned to American waters, British troops boarded the
ship, cut it adrift, set it on fire, and then sent it over the Niagara Falls. Two
American citizens were killed in the process. 3 8 The attack prompted an
American demand for redress, against which the British pleaded "the necessity
of self-defence and self-preservation." 1
39
The ensuing debate over the destruction of the Caroline led to a
celebrated correspondence between the American Secretary of State, Daniel
134. Id. at 176.
135. SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE oFFicio HOMINIS ET CIVIS LIBRI DUO [TwO BOOKS ON THE
DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZENS ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAw] 32 (Frank Gardner Moore trans., 1927)
(emphasis added).
136. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 154 (London, G.G. and J.
Robinson 1797).
137. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82 (1938).
138. Id. at 82-84.
139. Id. at 85.
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Webster, and the British special minister to Washington, Lord Ashburton,
which ultimately set forth two criteria for the permissible use of anticipatory
self-defense. The first criterion affirmed the principle of necessity as
established by Grotius and his successors, but made it more stringent. As
Webster explained to Lord Ashburton, the attacker must show a "necessity of
self-defence [that] is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation."" 4 The second criterion, proportionality,
was new. According to Webster, the attacker must also show that it "did
nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly with in
it."
14 1
The Caroline case, combined with the theories of commentators that
preceded it, has created under customary international law three distinct
elements necessary for the permissible exercise of anticipatory self-defense.
First, the threatened nation must exhaust all peaceful means of protection.
Second, the danger to the threatened nation must be imminent. Third, the
threatened nation's response must be proportionate to the threatened
danger.142
B. The U.N. Charter and Anticipatory Self-Defense
1. The U.N. Charter in Theory
Anticipatory self-defense is not mentioned in the U.N. Charter. Instead,
the Charter speaks simply of "self-defense." Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
4 3
140. 30 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS: 1841-1842, at 201 (1858). This definition of permissible
self-defense was employed by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in rejecting Nazi
Germany's claim of self-defense in its invasion of Norway in 1940. See BowETT, supra note 51, at 142.
141. Jennings, supra note 137, at 89.
142. A fourth possible criterion has been suggested. The right to anticipatory self-defense "arises
only after a breach of international law by a state which threatens the legitimate rights of a claimant state."
Matt S. Nydell, Note, Tensions Between International Law and Strategic Security: Implications of Israel's
Preemptive Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 459, 471 (1984).
143. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The inclusion of Article 51 can be seen as an attempt to rectify a
problem with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris. The Pact made no mention of a right to self-defense. This
omission led a number of states, including the United States, to present notes prior to ratification of the
Pact indicating their understanding that wars launched in self-defense would be lawful. Multilateral Treaty
for Renunciation of War: Identic Notes of the Government of the United States, 22 AM. J. INT' L. 109
(Supp. 1928) (sent to 14 foreign governments); General Pact for the Renunciation of War: Notes Between
the United States and Other Powers, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1929) (replies of foreign governments);
see also YORAM DiNsTEiN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 8 1-82 (1988); Wright, supra note 10,
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The absence of any provision in the Charter dealing with anticipatory self-
defense and the ambiguous language of the Article 51 have combined to divide
legal scholarship on this issue.
One group of scholars interprets the language of Article 51 narrowly,'"
focusing particular attention on the provision that provides that nothing shall
impair the right of self-defense "if an armed attack occurs." 145 These
scholars suggest that the plain meaning of the language would rule out any use
of force in anticipation of an attack. Moreover, Article 51, read in conjunction
with Article 33,'" confines states to peaceful means for dispute resolution
until an actual armed attack occurs.' 47
Other scholars interpret the language of Article 51 in a broader sense. 4
These scholars point to the language that "nothing shall impair" the right to
self-defense. Their argument is that Article 51 preserves, not extinguishes, the
right to anticipatory self-defense as developed under customary international
law. As Professor McDougal notes:
[Njothing in the "plain and natural meaning" of the words of the Charter requires an
interpretation that Article 51 restricts the customary right of self-defense. The proponents
of such an interpretation substitute for the words "if an armed attack occurs" the very
different words "if, and only if, an armed attack occurs."
149
The proponents of this second school bolster their interpretation by pointing
to the negotiating history, which reveals that Article 51 was written to
incorporate the entire customary law of self-defense. 5 ° This broader
at 42-43.
144. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 140-44 (2d ed.
1979) (arguing that only "small and special exception" to Article 51's prohibition against anticipatory self-
defense is surprise nuclear attack); PHILIP C. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1949) ("Under
the Charter, alarming military preparations by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security
Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself threatened.");
Dinstein, supra note 143, at 173 ("Recourse to self-defence under the Article [51] is not vindicated by any
violation of international law short of an armed attack."); see also GOODRICH, supra note 20, at 342-53
(supporting restrictive interpretation of Article 51 in which self-defense is justified only as response to
armed attack).
145. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
146. See supra text accompanying note 43.
147. Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 560 (1963) (arguing that there
is no right of military self-defense in case of mere "threats" under Charter).
148. See, e.g., BOwETT, supra note 51, at 191 ("It is not believed, therefore, that Art. 51 restricts
the traditional right of self-defense so as to exclude action taken against an imminent danger but before
'an armed attack occurs.'"); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 236 (1961) ("'Legitimate
self-defense,' encompassing anticipatory defense, has long been honored in traditional authoritative myth
as one of the fundamental 'rights of sovereign states'. . . [and] limitations or derogations from sovereign
competence are not lightly to be assumed."); JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A
CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 98-101 (1958) (arguing that narrow
interpretation of Article 51's "self-defense" provisions and Article 2(4)'s prohibition of "force" does not
make "moral, political or even legal sense").
149. Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and SeIf-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597,
600 (1963).
150. See Summary Report of Fourth Meeting of Cormnittee, Doe. 576, 111/4/9 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs.
6799 (1945) [hereinafter Doec. 576]; Doec. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 387, 400 (1945) [hereinafter
Doc. 8851 (stating that under Article 2(4) of Charter "self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired");
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interpretation is not only supported by the Charter's legislative history,"'
but is also necessitated by the changed technologies of war.152 As noted
earlier, the Charter is "pre-atomic. "153
2. The U.N. Charter in Practice
Although there has been no authoritative decision of an international
adjudicatory body on the question of anticipatory self-defense,154 the
Security Council has examined three prominent instances of state action that
involve some form of anticipatory self-defense. Taken together, the three
instances suggest that coercive arms control, and other forms of anticipatory
self-defense, are permitted under the Charter. The following section will
briefly examine each use of force in turn.
a. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War
On June 5, 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a series of deep
penetration bombing raids against Egyptian air bases. The raids achieved
complete tactical surprise: they destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground
and thereby opened the way for a decisive victory by the Israeli army over its
Arab adversaries during the course of the next six days.
In the debate that followed Israel's attack, a central question in the
see also W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 420-21 (1982)
(arguing that French text, which is equally authentic as English, more accurately reflects negotiating
history by its choice of the broad term "aggression arm~e," encompassing the English conception of
"armed attack," but not limited to it); McDougal, supra note 149, at 600 (observing that "apparent
purpose of the inept language of Article 51 ... was only that of accommodating regional organizations").
151. While original intent is not dispositive, it is an authorized supplementary means of treaty
construction. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, art. 32 ("[R]ecourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning [of the treaty] when the interpretation
according to [facial construction] leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure . . .
152. Professor McDougal notes:
[U]nder the hard conditions of the contemporary technology of destruction, which makes
possible the complete obliteration of states with still incredible speed from still incredible
distances, the principle of effectiveness, requiring that agreements be interpreted in accordance
with the major purposes and demands projected by the parties, could scarcely be served by
requiring states confronted with the necessity for defense to assume the posture of "sitting
ducks." Any such interpretation could only make a mockery, both in its acceptability to states
and in its potential application, of the Charter's major purpose of minimizing unauthorized
coercion and violence across state lines.
McDougal, supra note 149, at 600-01. Or as Professor Rostow put it more recently, "International law,
after all, is not a suicide pact." Eugene V. Rostow, Law "is not a Suicide Pact," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1983, at A35.
153. See supra text accompanying note 72.
154. The closest the International Court of Justice has come in recent years to commenting on the
right of anticipatory self-defense was in the case involving American covert military operations against the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
347-48 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (noting that under Article 51 self-defense was not limited to
a situation if, and only if, an armed attack occurs).
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Security Council was determining the best evidence of aggression: a first shot
or threats?"55 While the Security Council never arrived at an explicit answer
to this question, it implicitly affirmed that threats can justify the exercise of
self-defense. Of the three resolutions adopted by the Security Council during
the course of the war, none condemned Israel for its attack. 56 More
significantly, a resolution submitted by the Soviet Union calling for a
condemnation of Israel 57 was rejected first by the Security Council and then
by the General Assembly. 5 ' While the outcome in the Security Council may
be explained by the veto power of Israel's principal patron, the United States,
the same cannot be said for the General Assembly, where each nation's vote
counts equally.
Irrespective of the operative definition of aggression, the initial Israeli
attack arguably constituted a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense under
customary international law. In regard to necessity, Israel can point to
provocative actions by Egypt in the month preceding the Israeli attack. On
May 18, four days after putting its armed forces into a state of maximum
alert, 59 Egypt terminated its consent for the presence on its soil of the U.N.
Emergency Force (UNEF), which had served as a buffer between Egyptian
and Israeli forces since the 1956 war. 60 Four days later, Egypt closed the
Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping.' By early June, the armed forces of
Syria, Jordan, and Iraq were placed under a unified Egyptian command that
also included military units from Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, and Sudan. 62 Out-
manned, out-gunned, and with no ability to trade land for time, Israel was
compelled to seize the military advantage.
As for the requirement of prior exhaustion of alternative means of dispute
resolution, Israel also conformed to the standard of customary international
law. After Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran, Israel sent its foreign minister on
a mission to London, Paris, and Washington in search of a diplomatic
155. See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV/1348 (1967). The main lines of the
Security Council debate were replayed among the pundits. Compare M.C. Bassiouni, The Middle East:
The Misunderstood Conflict, in 2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLicT 327, 347-50 (John Norton Moore ed.,
1977) (arguing that Israel was aggressor in 1967 war because it "started the shooting") with Amos Shapira,
The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, 6 ISR. L. REv. 65, 73-75 (1971) (arguing that Israel was
not aggressor because it was faced with imminent attack).
156. See S.C. Res 233, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/7935 (1967); S.C.
Res. 234, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1350th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/7941 (1967); S.C. Res. 235, U.N.
SCOR, 22d Sess., 1352d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/7960 (1967).
157. See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1351st mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/7951 (1967).
158. U.N. GAOR, 5th Emergency Special Sess., 1548th mtg. 10, 171, U.N. Doc. AIPV. 1525.
1559 (1967).
159. NADAV SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, 1948-1967, at
268 (1969).
160. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Near East, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess.,
10, U.N. Doc. S/7896 (1967).
161. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Near East, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess.,
10, U.N. Doc. S/7906 (1967).
162. SAFRAN, supra note 159, at 271, 294.
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resolution to the crisis.163 And as late as May 28, the Israeli prime minister
announced that Israel would continue its political efforts to reopen the Strait
of Tiran "to obviate the necessity of Israel having to use armed force for its
defense." 1" This statement stands in stark contrast to the more bellicose
rhetoric coming from Egypt's leadership at the time.16
More problematic, however, is the proportionality of Israel's response.
While the initial raids by the Israeli Air Force were narrowly tailored to
eliminate a military threat, the same cannot be said for Israel's later conduct.
The subsequent occupation and annexation of the Gaza Strip, the Sinai
peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River including the city of Jerusalem,
and the Golan Heights does not seem proportionate to the initial threat
confronting Israel.
b. The 1981 Israeli Raid on Tuwaitha
On June 7, 1981, eight Israeli fighter-bombers swept in low over Iraq's
nuclear research facility outside of Baghdad and, in two minutes, effectively
destroyed a nearly operational nuclear reactor. 66 Acting upon information
from "[s]ources of unquestioned reliability," 67 Israel had launched the
attack out of a perceived need for self-defense. According to the official
Israeli statement on the raid, the reactor was
intended... for the production of bombs. The goal for these bombs was Israel. This was
explicitly stated by the Iraqi ruler. After the Iranians slightly damaged the reactor, Saddam
Hussein remarked that it was pointless for the Iranians to attack the reactor because it was
being built against Israel alone. 168
Despite its immediate condemnation of the raid,169 the United States
163. Id. at 269.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., U.A.R. Statement on Withdrawal of U.N.E.F. and Closing of Strait of Tiran to
Israeli Ships, in part reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 573 (1967) (excerpting an unofficial translation of speech by
Egyptian President Nasser to United Arab Republic Air Force Advanced Command on May 22, 1967);
see also SAFRAN, supra note 159, at 270 (citing President Nasser's speech to Egyptian National Assembly
on May 30, 1967, in which Nasser transformed conflict from one about UNEF and rights of innocent
shipping to one of Palestinian rights).
Israel's restrained behavior through the May crisis stands in contrast not only to Egypt's behavior
but also to Israel's own behavior prior to May. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol's tentative handling of the
crisis created a crisis of confidence within Israel as to Eshkol's competence. This second crisis became
so profound Eshkol was forced to surrender the defense minister's portfolio, which he also held, to Moshe
Dayan on June 1. See NADAV SAFRAN, ISRAEL: THE EMBATTLED ALLY 405-06 (1981). In a Cabinet post-
mortem of the May-June crisis two days after the war ended, Moshe Dayan identified Israel's principal
mistake in the crisis as "a failure to react at once to Egypt's blockade of the straits .... We waited and
this plunged us into a complex situation." MosHE DAYAN, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 379 (1976). For a
detailed examination of Israeli decisionmaking during the 1967 crisis, see MICHAEL BREACHER, DECISIONS
IN CRISIS: 1967 AND 1973 (1980).
166. Shipler, supra note 1, at A1; see also George Russell, Attack - and Fallout; Israel Blasts
Iraq's Reactor and Creates a Global Shock Wave, TIME, June 22, 1981, at 24.
167. Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 1981, at A8.
168. Id.
169. Shipler, supra note 1, at Al.
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government confirmed that Israel's fears about Iraq's nuclear capability were
justified.'7 Other governments shared this view to some degree. While Arab
governments roundly condemned the attack in public,' there was confident
speculation that a number of those same governments were quietly relieved
that, at least for the moment, the danger of Iraqi hegemony over the Arab
world had been eliminated. 72
Despite similar assessments of Iraqi capability by other governments, the
Security Council unanimously condemned the Israeli raid. 7  Yet Iran had
attacked the very same facility a few months earlier during its war with Iraq
and had not been condemned by the international community. 74 While legal
scholars have raised serious questions about whether Israel's raid was
proportionate 75 and whether it followed an exhaustive search for a peaceful
resolution of the dispute,7  the lack of immediacy was dispositive for the
Security Council.
The Israeli argument for immediacy, as presented in the official statement
following the attack'" and by the statements of the Israeli ambassador to the
United Nations,' 78 unfolded along two lines. Israel argued that Iraq was well
advanced in its nuclear weapons program and that as soon as Iraq acquired a
nuclear capability, it would attack Israel. Israel then argued that, because the
reactor at Tuwaitha would soon be operational, Israel had to strike
immediately or risk exposing the citizens of Baghdad to unacceptable levels
of radiation.
In contrast to the layered approach to immediacy adopted by Israel, the
Security Council focused on the perceived nuclear threat to Israel and ignored
the issue of nuclear danger to Iraqi citizens from an Israeli attack. For many
of the Council members, the critical fact was that, at the time of the raid, Iraq
170. Judith Miller, U.S. Officials Say Iraq Had Ability to Make Nuclear Weapon in 1981, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A9 (reporting that American diplomats and intelligence officials "believed that
Iraq had acquired enough enriched uranium and sensitive technology to make one nuclear weapon by the
end of [1981] and several bombs by the mid 1980s").
171. Arabs Assail Raid as "Peak of International Terrorism," N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at Al.
172. David K. Shipler, Pride and Punishment: Israelis Insist Air Raid on Iraqis Was Justified, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1981, at Al.
173. S.C. Res. 487, supra note 2, at 993.
174. On September 30, 1980, as part of the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, Iranian aircraft attacked the
Tuwaitha research complex. See LEONARD S. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY 177 (1984).
Iraq suggested that the Iranian attack was really carried out by Israeli aircraft flying Iranian colors, See
U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (1981) (statement of Iraqi Foreign
Minister Hammadi). This rumor was apparently put to rest when Iranian President Bani Sadr reportedly
admitted that Iran was responsible. Roger F. Pajak, Nuclear Status and Policies of the Middle East
Countries, 59 INT'L AFF. 587, 598 (1983).
It should also be noted that Iraq attacked Iranian nuclear facilities seven times between 1984 and
1988 without producing a reaction from the international community in any way comparable to that
accorded the 1981 Israeli raid. The fact that the two countries were at war may account for the
international community's silence. See LEONARD S. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS 417-20 (1990).
175. See, e.g., Mallison & Mallison, supra note 150, at 431-32.
176. See, e.g., id. at 427-29.
177. Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at AS.
178. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 57-60, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (1981) (statement of
Permanent Representative of Israel to United Nations Yehuda Blum).
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did not possess nuclear weapons capability. Under the Caroline rules there
was no military necessity for the attack because Israel faced no immediate
nuclear danger.1
79
Moreover, as the representative from Sierra Leone observed, the Israeli
attack failed to satisfy another requirement of the rule of necessity, an absence
of premeditation.' A precision strike, like Israel's raid, obviously could
not be mounted overnight, but required weeks, if not months, of training.
Prime Minister Begin's comments on the day after the attack suggest how long
Israel contemplated its strike. Begin acknowledged that he had informed the
leader of the opposition Labor Party about plans for the attack three months
earlier.' Under Caroline, anticipatory self-defense requires a necessity for
action that leaves "no moment for deliberation";" 2 the Israeli action did not
meet such a test." 3
A comparison of the Security Council's responses to Israeli actions in
1967 and 1981 indicates that, prior to the Gulf War, coercive arms control
was not deemed a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense under the
Charter. It was not lawful because inherent in the notion of coercive arms
control is an understanding that the threat, while real and approaching, is not
entirely imminent. The Charter, in contrast, permitted only the absolutely
necessary use of force. That Israel, with its powerful allies in the Security
Council, launched the anticipatory attack in each instance bolsters this
conclusion, because it suggests that the Council's negative ruling was
motivated by principle rather than politics.
To stop here, however, and conclude that, prior to Resolution 678, the
unilateral exercise of coercive arms control was illegal under the Charter
would be premature; arguably, the touchstone event of the nuclear age after
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an act of coercive arms control. Significantly,
this act of coercive arms control involved a less than imminent threat. Perhaps
most important, this act of coercive arms control was endorsed, at least
tacitly, by the Security Council.
179. As the British delegate explained:
It has been argued that the Israeli attack was an act of self-defence. But it was not a response
to an armed attack on Israel by Iraq. There was no instant or overwhelming necessity for self-
defence. Nor can it be justified as a forcible measure of self-protection. The Israeli
intervention amounted to a use of force which cannot find a place in international law or in
the Charter and which violated the sovereignty of Iraq.
U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282 mtg. at 106, U.N. Doc. SIPVI2282 (1981) (statement of Sir Anthony
Parsons, Permanent Representative of United Kingdom to United Nations).
180. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2283d mtg. at 145, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2283 (1981) (statement of Mr.
Koroma, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to United Nations) [hereinafter Koroma Statement].
181. Shipler, supra note 1, at AS. It was subsequently reported that Israel had opened a "combat
file" on Tuwaitha as early as 1979 and had begun aerial reconnaissance of the site as early as June 1980.
Russell, supra note 166, at 26.
182. See supra text accompanying note 140.
183. See, e.g., Koroma Statement, supra note 180, at 148.
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c. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
The executive chairman of the U.N. Special Commission established to
implement the forced disarmament of Iraq asserted that the ceasefire terms
imposed on Iraq are "the first modern example of arms control through
imposition.""M The chairman's comments reflect the fact that analysts have
generally not interpreted the Cuban Missile Crisis as an act of coercive arms
control. Instead, political scientists have concentrated on the decisionmaking
process during the crisis."85 Specialists in international politics have stressed
the importance of the Cuban Missile Crisis in restructuring the conduct of
nuclear diplomacy and effectively ending the true Cold War. 86 Arms
control experts have focused on the impetus the crisis gave to formal arms
control agreements. ' International lawyers have concerned themselves with
whether legal authorization for the American quarantine of Cuba came from
the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty,' or from Article
51 as an act of collective self-defense." 9 No one has specifically examined
the Cuban Missile Crisis as an act of coercive arms control.
The missile crisis began on October 16, 1962, when President Kennedy
was informed that U.S. intelligence agencies had hard evidence that the Soviet
Union was deploying medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba. On
October 20, Kennedy decided to impose a naval quarantine on the further
delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba and to insist on the prompt withdrawal
of all Soviet missiles already delivered. On October 22, the President
informed the Soviet Union, the United Nations, the American public, and the
rest of the world of his decision. Thirteen days after it began, on October 28,
the crisis ended with a public statement by Premier Khrushchev that the Soviet
Union would remove all offensive missiles from Cuba.'90
Three significant aspects of the crisis are relevant to coercive arms
184. Rolf Ekeus, The Iraqi Experience and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation, 15 WASH. Q.
67, 68 (1992). By "modem," Ekeus is referring to the post-1945 era, thereby excluding from consideration
the Versailles peace treaty, which compelled the disarmament of Imperial Germany.
185. See, e.g., HANNES ADOMEIT, SOVIET RISK-TAKING AND CRISIS BEHAVIOR: A THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1982); GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS (1971).
186. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE NUCLEAR QUESTION: THE UNITED STATES AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, 1946-1976, at 144-57 (1979).
187. STANFORD ARMS CONTROL GROUP, INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND
AGREEMENTS 110-11 (1984).
188. See generally ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRIsIs: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE
ROLE OF LAW (1974).
189. Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 506, 516 (1991).
190. An excellent chronology of the crisis can be found in THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962: A
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS READER 347-400 (Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh eds.,
1992) [hereinafter CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS]. Although the crisis did not officially end until November 20
when the quarantine was lifted and the alert status for American military commands returned to normal,
the consensus definition of the crisis's beginning and end points conforms to that outlined by President
Kennedy's brother. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 23, 105-10 (1969).
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control. First, the decisive factor in the outcome of the crisis was the
threatened use of force by the United States. Despite ongoing debate over
whether American nuclear superiority or American conventional superiority
in the Caribbean was ultimately decisive in forcing the Soviets to withdraw
their missiles,191 few question that American military strength was in fact
decisive. In the judgment of one prominent student of the crisis, "Khrushchev
withdrew the Soviet missiles not because of the blockade, not because of the
implicit threat of 'further action,' but because of an explicit threat of air strike
or invasion on Tuesday - unless he served immediate notice that the missiles
would be withdrawn."
192
In recent years, as more and more documents have become declassified,
some observers have noted that the outcome may have constituted a negotiated
settlement much more than had been previously suspected. Revelations that
Kennedy had possibly agreed not to invade Cuba193 and had offered to
remove American medium-range missiles from Turkey in exchange for the
withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba have fueled this suspicion.194
Unaided diplomacy, however, would hardly have succeeded in getting the
missiles out of Cuba. The Soviet Union gambled on such a risky deployment
in order to redress a highly unfavorable balance of strategic forces.195 An
exchange of Soviet missiles in Cuba for American missiles in Turkey would
have left the strategic balance intact and heavily in favor of the United
States. 196 In summary, Kennedy's assurances about the missiles in Turkey
were far less important than the threat of American military action.197 In
191. The issue of the respective roles played by the nuclear and conventional balance of forces is
intimately bound up with an even more enduring and contentious issue: the strategic importance of the
Soviet missile deployment to Cuba. For the perspective of four key American decisionmakers, see JAMES
G. BLIGHT & DAVID A. WELCH, ON THE BRINK: AMERICANS AND SOVIETS REEXAMINE THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRIsis 137-200 (1989).
192. ALLISON, supra note 185, at 65.
193. For an assessment of the so-called "no invasion" pledge, see MICHAEL R. BEScHLoss, THE
CRISIS YEARS: KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV, 1960-1963, at 564-68 (1991); RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF,
REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 125-29, 140-44 (1989).
194. For a detailed examination of the Soviet request to remove U.S. missiles in Turkey and
Kennedy's response, see Barton J. Bernstein, Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems
of the American Jupiters in Turkey, in THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS REVISITED 55-129 (James A. Nathan
ed., 1992).
195. This is the consensus view of most American commentators on the crisis. See, e.g., ALLISON,
supra note 185, at 50-56, 237-44; HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN, THE MAKING OF A MISSILE CRISIS: OCTOBER
1962, at 150-83, 186-87 (1976); ARNOLD L. HORELICK & MYRON RUSH, STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY 126-40 (1966). This is also the view of Khrushchev himself. While Khrushchev publicly
spoke of a need to defend Cuba from American attack in 1962, in his memoirs he acknowledged the
importance of transforming the strategic balance as an additional rationale for the deployment. See NIKITA
S. KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS 492-94 (Strobe Talbott trans. & ed., 1970).
196. The London-based Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that in 1962 the Soviet Union had
only 75 intercontinental ballistic missiles, in comparison to the 350 deployed by the United States.
COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1962-63, at 25 (1963).
197. During the crisis Kennedy had mobilized over 200,000 assault troops in Florida for an
immediate invasion of Cuba. Moreover, he had increased the alert status of U.S. military forces world
wide. See ALLISON, supra note 185, at 62-66. As one American participant in the deliberations later
concluded, "Khrushchev was in a position of such inferiority ... that unlike the president he must [sic]
fear not only the unpredictable consequences of accident, but the certainty of defeat at every level up to
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1962, the United States was able to achieve, with only the threat of force,
what Israel and the United States tried to achieve with the actual use of force
in 1981 and 1991 respectively.' 9"
Second, the Soviet missile deployments in Cuba did not present a threat
of imminent war to the United States. The Soviets did not deploy missiles in
Cuba in order to launch a war against the United States. Rather, the Soviets
sought long-term geopolitical advantage from the deployment; it was designed
to reverse the true "missile gap." 199 Ever since Sputnik's launch in 1957,
many American observers thought that the Soviet Union had leap-frogged
ahead of the United States in the balance of strategic nuclear forces." ° This
alleged missile gap became a centerpiece of John Kennedy's campaign for the
presidency in 1960.201 While a missile gap existed in 1960-61, it completely
favored the United States. By 1961, satellite reconnaissance revealed the
reality of the missile gap to the Kennedy administration, which, in turn, made
it known to the Soviets and the rest of the world. In a deliberate attempt to
expose Khrushchev's pretensions to nuclear superiority, Kennedy's Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, revealed the full extent of American
superiority in a public speech:
The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy
move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part .... The
destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise
attack upon our forces would be as great as - perhaps greater - than the total undamaged
force which the enemy can threaten to launch against the United States in a first strike. In
short, we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets
can deliver by striking first.
2" 2
While Soviet MRBMs in Cuba would have posed a threat to some of the
Strategic Air Command's bomber bases, they would have affected the
strategic balance only at the margins.0 3 The central concern for the
common catastrophe." MCGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL: CHOICES ABOUT THE BOMB IN THE3
FIRST FIFTY YEARS 440 (1988).
198. That the outcome of the Cuban Missile crisis was not negotiated but coerced was plainly evident
in the bitter warning given by Vasily Kuznetsov to John McCloy as both men were overseeing the removal
of the missiles from Cuba: "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again." BEsCHLOSS, supra
note 193, at 563 (1991); see also GARTHOFF, supra note 193, at 145 ("The American action had been an
offensive use of military power - compellance, not deterrence - and [had] spurred Soviet resolve to
acquire countervailing strategic military power. And while they would never admit it openly, they deeply
nursed resentment that they had been compelled to give up a prerogative of great power status. The
outcome of the Cuban missile crisis had been a rankling defeat in the cold war.").
199. See sources cited supra note 195.
200. See BUNDY, supra note 197, at 337-38.
201. JOHN F. KENNEDY, A STRATEGY FOR PEACE 33-45 (Allen Nevins ed., 1960) (reprinting
Kennedy's most important speech on subject); see also EDGAR M. BOTTOME, THE MISSILE GAP: A STUDY
OF THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICY 115-46 (1971).
202. Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Address to the Business Council (Oct. 21, 1961), in
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1961, at 542, 544-45 (U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency ed.,
1962).
203. The deployment of 72 MRBMs to Cuba would in effect have doubled the Soviet first-strike
capability. Still, as Gilpatric made clear in his speech, the Strategic Air Command had a tremendous
advantage in strategic bombers over the Soviet Union. DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1961, supra note
202, at 544. However, the Soviet deployment could have affected the strategic balance in a more
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American leadership was not the military but rather the political significance
of the missiles. As Professor McGeorge Bundy notes, "What was decisive for
the president was not the number of missiles in prospect, or their strategic
value, but the political damage that the United States and its government
would suffer if any nuclear missiles at all that could reach the United States
from Cuba were tolerated." 2I Thus, the threat posed by the missiles lay less
in their direct military value than in their geopolitical consequences. This lack
of immediacy suggests that the Cuban missile crisis more closely resembles
the Israeli and American raids on Tuwaitha than the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The third significant point about the Cuban Missile Crisis in regard to the
legality of coercive arms control is that the United Nations implicitly endorsed
the outcome. That the United Nations supported the outcome can be argued
on three grounds. First, as with the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, neither the
General Assembly nor the Security Council issued a resolution condemning
American military action. This argument, however, says very little about the
legality of coercive arms control because the American naval quarantine,
although approved by the Organization of American States (OAS), was not
explicitly approved by the Security Council. Under Article 53 of the Charter,
the Security Council must authorize enforcement actions "taken under regional
arrangements."2"5 The lack of explicit Security Council approval for the
quarantine thus might even be interpreted as a condemnation of it. Moreover,
the Security Council was split along the ideological and political divides of the
Cold War. The United States offered a resolution condemning the Soviet
Union,2' and the Soviet Union offered a resolution condemning the United
States.2"7 The remaining members of Security Council ignored both and
simply encouraged the parties to seek a peaceful resolution to their dispute.
A second, and more intriguing, argument for U.N. endorsement of
American coercive arms control tries to bypass the problem posed by Article
53. This argument has been offered by Abram Chayes and Leonard Meeker,
the U.S. Department of State's Legal Advisor and his Deputy during the
missile crisis. Chayes and Meeker have argued that, by not condemning the
quarantine, the Security Council's actions amounted to a formal endorsement
of the action.2"' While this "not-unauthorized"2 9 line of reasoning has
significant way, if the first set of missiles had been followed by more. As two analysts concluded, "The
sudden installation of a sizeable number of nuclear bombardment vehicles in Cuba, and the long-term
prospects of such a base very near American shores, offered much foundation for sober thought about
significant alterations in the military balance." Albert Wohlstetter & Roberta Wohlstetter, Controlling the
Risks in Cuba, 17 ADELPHI PAPERS 12 (1965).
204. BUNDY, supra note 197, at 452.
205. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, 1.
206. U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 1022d mtg. at 16, U.N. Doe. S/5182 (1962).
207. U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 1022d mtg. at 36, U.N. Doc. S/5187 (1962).
208. Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 556 (1963)
("[F]ailure of the Security Council to disapprove regional action amounts to authorization within the
meaning of Article 53."); see also Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 515, 522 (1963) (arguing that since quarantine continued with Security Council's knowledge,
"authorization [for the quarantine] may be said to have been granted by the course which the Council
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received some support,21° the scholarly literature has generally rejected it.
This argument would make a mockery of the Security Council's primary
responsibility for international peace and security.2 '
The third, and most convincing, argument that the United Nations
endorsed the outcome of the crisis was its willingness to implement the
agreement. On October 27, Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev to communicate his
terms for ending the crisis. Kennedy first demanded that the Soviet Union
remove its missiles from Cuba under U.N. supervision.212 Khrushchev
responded the next day by agreeing to Kennedy's terms, and noting that U.N.
officials could verify the dismantling of the missiles.213 Not only did both
superpowers turn to the United Nations, but the United Nations eagerly
embraced the result. In early November, Secretary-General U Thant went to
Cuba to negotiate a U.N. inspection plan with Fidel Castro. Although his
initial effort met with a blunt refusal to allow U.N. inspectors on Cuban
soil,214 U Thant tried again. Instead of relying on U.N. inspectors, the
Secretary-General "put forward a suggestion that the five Latin American
Ambassadors in Havana be named as inspectors and travel throughout
Cuba."" 5 Although this suggestion was also rejected, the United Nations did
support the quarantine's outcome.
This line of argument becomes all the more convincing if the U.S./OAS
quarantine is seen as an act of collective self-defense under Article 51, and
not an enforcement action by a regional organization under Article 53. An act
of collective self-defense, unlike a regional enforcement action, does not
require formal Security Council approval. Hence, any voluntary action by the
United Nations in support of an act of collective self-defense can be seen as
an endorsement.
In fact, the U.S./OAS quarantine is most easily and logically interpreted
as an act of self-defense. That was certainly how President Kennedy justified
adopted").
209. AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 62.
210. John W. Halderman, Regional Enforcement Measures and the United Nations, 52 GEO. L.J.
89, 110 (1963) (arguing that "the authority conferred upon the United Nations by article 53, enabling it
to control such measures [as the quarantine] from the outset, may be considered as a fundamentally
important power, abandonment of which would be decisive in admitting that regional organizations might
proceed on their own volition to interpose measures of force or other tangible pressures into international
situations").
211. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Comment, in CHAYES, supra note 188, at 150-51 (arguing that
authorization by "failure to disapprove" is sharply at odds with both spirit and letter of Chapter VIII of
Charter); JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDo-CHINA WAR 296, 343-45 (1972) (arguing that
Chayes and Meeker's interpretation would lead to undesirable loosening of Security Council control over
regional action).
212. Letter from President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev (Oct. 27, 1962), in CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS, supra note 190, at 224.
213. Letter from Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy (Oct. 28, 1962), in CUBAN MISSILE
CRIsis, supra note 190, at 227.
214. State Department Cable on U.N. Secretary General U Thant's Meetings with Prime Minister
Castro (Nov. 1, 1963), reprinted in CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, supra note 190, at 249.
215. Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee (Nov. 7, 1963), reprinted in CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS, supra note 190, at 267.
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his actions to the public on October 22.216 Moreover, the Security Council
debate itself was couched, explicitly and implicitly, in terms of self-defense
and anticipatory self-defense l.2 7 Finally, such an interpretation is consistent
with state practice under the Charter: when regional groupings want to
circumvent the requirements of Article 53, they turn to Article 51 and the
right of collective self-defense.21 Accordingly, the U.N. action in support
of the quarantine implicitly approved it as a legal act of collective self-defense
under Article 51.
d. Reconciling State Practice Under the Charter
Considering the Cuban Missile Crisis an act of self-defense makes it
easier to reconcile the crisis with the Israeli raid in 1981. In both instances,
the United Nations wrestled with the concept of self-defense in the nuclear
age. Addressing the concept of self-defense under the threat of nuclear war
is as old as the United Nations.1 9 The problem of anticipatory self-defense
with regard to nuclear weapons was officially brought to the Security
Council's attention as early as December 1946. The U.N. Atomic Energy
Commission included in its first report to the Security Council a memorandum
from the U.S. representative." 0 After noting that, under Article 51, states
have a right to self-defense after being attacked by atomic weapons,221 the
memorandum states:
It is equally clear that an "armed attack" is now something entirely different from what it
was prior to the discovery of atomic weapons. It would therefore seem to be both important
and appropriate under present conditions that the treaty define "armed attack" is [sic] a
manner appropriate to atomic weapons and include in the definition not simply the actual
dropping of an atomic bomb, but also certain steps in themselves preliminary to such
action.m
In defining self-defense rights in the nuclear age, the United Nations had to
determine which "certain steps" constituted justification for acts of self-
216. Radio-TV Address of the President to the Nation from the White House (Oct. 22, 1963),
reprinted in CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, supra note 190, at 150.
217. See AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 74-76.
218. INiS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 94-110 (1st ed. 1964). Scholarly opinion, then and now, has regarded
the quarantine as an act of collective self-defense. See C.G. Fenwick, The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal
or Illegal?, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 588 (1963); Brunson MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine"
of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592 (1963); McDougal, supra note 149, at 597; Rostow, supra note 189,
at 515.
219. Coercive arms control directed at the proliferation of nuclear weapons actually predates the
United Nations. See DAVID IRVING, THE GERMAN ATOMIC BOMB: THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH
IN NAZI GERMANY 155-71, 201-11 (1967) (describing British commando operations in 1943 against heavy
water plant at Vemork in Nazi-occupied Norway, and sinking of Norwegian ferry that was carrying 613
liters of heavy water destined for German nuclear weapon research program).
220. The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 2d
Sess., Special Supp., Annex 4, at 106, U.N. Doe. 5/Supplements (1946).
221. Id. at 109.
222. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
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defense and what responses to those "certain steps" were permitted.
(1) Defining "Certain Steps"
By endorsing the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United Nations
implicitly adopted a "technical" theory of how and why wars begin. Technical
theories of war stress the configuration of opposing military forces, their war
plans, and mobilization schedules. Those who espouse these theories assume
that the decision for war is devoid of political content. They believe that when
the configuration of forces reaches a certain point, war occurs. Under this
theory, war can actually occur by accident. A great and terrible war might
arise due to a temptation to preempt, even if there was "no 'fundamental'
basis for attack by either side."'
The technical theory of war represents a radical departure from the more
traditional, or political, theory of war. The traditional theory stresses that
wars are political actions taken for political purposes; they are neither
accidental nor the result of military phenomena. Wars, under the political
theory, "begin with conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation
made by both parties that they can achieve more by going to war than by
remaining at peace."'
At the time of the Cuban Missile crisis, the technical theory was in
ascendancy among practitioners, particularly in the United States.2" Taking
their cue from the rigid mobilization schedules that contributed to the onset
of World War I, American nuclear strategists sought to devise a configuration
of nuclear forces that allowed for "crisis stability." Crisis stability was
defined as a configuration of opposing forces that did not generate pressure
for escalation or preemption; it occurred when there was no "reciprocal fear
of surprise attack."226 During the 1950s, a series of government-sponsored
studies argued that the danger of surprise attack was highest when strategic
forces were vulnerable to preemption.22 7 As Thomas Schelling and Morton
223. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CoNFLICT 207 (1960). The concern in the 1970s
and early 1980s over a "window of vulnerability" - a fear that the vulnerability of American ICBMs
would invite Soviet preemption in a crisis - is a recent example of the technical theory of war. One of
the many proponents of the "window of vulnerability" school of thought was Paul Nitze. See generally
Paul Nitze, Assuring Strategic Stability in the Era of Detente, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 207 (1976); see also
STROBE TALBOTT, THE MASTER OF THE GAME: PAUL NiTzE AND THE NUCLEAR PEACE 151-61 (1988)
(discussing Nitze's views on "window of vulnerability").
224. Michael Howard, The Cause of Wars, 8 WILSON Q. 103 (1984). Another prominent historian
who follows the traditional approach in explaining wars is Geoffrey Blainey. See GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE
CAUSES OF WARS (1973).
225. This theory had even found popular expression at the time of the crisis in Barbara Tuchman's
history of origins of World War I. See BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST (1962). Kennedy
himself had read Tuchman's book shortly before the crisis and spoke during the crisis on past
miscalculations of other nations in stumbling into war. See KENNEDY, supra note 190, at 62.
226. SCHELLING, supra note 223, at 207.
227. See, e.g., A.J. WOHLsTETrER ET AL., SELECTION AND USE OF STRATEGIC AIR BASES (Rand
Corp. Report R-266, 1954); see also Albert J. Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FOREIGN
AFF. 221 (1959) (summarizing findings of then-classified Gaither Committee Report).
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Halperin observed in 1961, the "most mischievous character of today's
strategic weapons is that they provide an enormous advantage in the event that
war occurs to the side that starts it." 8
The technical school's emphasis on military force configurations and
surprise attacks explains why the United Nations implicitly found that the
United States was within its right to self-defense in 1962, but explicitly found
that Israel exceeded that same right in 1981. Unlike the United States in 1962,
Israel had nothing yet to fear from the configuration of Iraqi strategic forces.
In Cuba in 1962, there were not only accurate, nuclear-capable rockets, but
also nuclear warheads for those rocketsY 9 In contrast, in Iraq in 1981 there
were no nuclear rockets capable of striking Israel, let alone nuclear warheads
to go atop those rockets.
Through its actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United Nations
acknowledged that "certain steps" well short of an armed attack could trigger
Article 51's right to self-defense. Through its condemnation of the 1981
Israeli raid on Tuwaitha, the United Nations established that those "certain
steps" did not encompass the mere potential to deploy certain types of weapon
systems. At a minimum, provocative weapon systems had to be actually
deployed. The United Nations' emphasis on force configuration also explains
its approval of the Israeli attack in 1967. As in 1962, the hostile configuration
of forces-in-being, as opposed to potential forces, justified a preventive (or at
least preemptive) military action.
(2) How to Respond to "Certain Steps"
In trying to determine what range of action a threatened state can take in
response to provocative "certain steps" toward war, the United Nations has
given priority to political responses. Regardless of how threatening the
deployment of military force might appear, states have an obligation to find
a peaceful resolution to the crisis. This emphasis on political action first, and
military action permitting a peaceful resolution second, is consistent with the
Charter's dual aim of avoiding war and encouraging the peaceful resolution
of disputes. It also explains why American action in 1962 and Israeli action
in 1967 were given at least tacit approval, while the Israeli action in 1981 was
roundly condemned. In the former instances, there was a commitment to
exhausting or at least exploring a peaceful end to the crises. In the latter,
there was no attempt by Israel to explore a non-violent remedy to its fears of
Iraqi nuclear power.
Moreover, Israel's decision to act in a completely unilateral fashion in
1981 stands in stark contrast to Israeli action in 1967 and American action in
228. THOMAS C. SCHELLING & MORTON HALPERin, STRATEGY AND ARMs CONTROL 9 (1961).
229. See generally Pascal Fletcher, Castro Lifts Lid off 1962 Missile Crisis, Reuters, Feb. 27, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
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1962. In the latter two cases, both states sought to end the crisis by involving
other states. Israel sent its foreign minister to the United States, Britain, and
France in May of 1967; the United States sought the approval of the OAS as
well as the United Nations. Both thus implicitly argued that their situations
involved international peace and security, not just their own. The
condemnation of Israel in 1981 following its raid on Tuwaitha suggests that
the invocation of support from some community of states is an essential
prerequisite for the permissible exercise of coercive arms control under the
Charter.
To summarize, although neither anticipatory self-defense nor coercive
arms control is mentioned in the Charter, both were permitted under the
Charter prior to the Gulf War. They were allowed if the three essential
conditions for exercising the customary right of anticipatory self-defense were
present: an imminent threat actually existing; a legitimate exploration of
alternative means to ending the crisis; and proportionate use of military force
in response to the threat. A fourth factor - the support of some community
of states - may be necessary for the legal exercise of coercive arms control
under the self-defense exception to the Charter's prohibition on the use of
force.
C. The Gulf War: New Precedent for the Exercise of Coercive Arms Control
Without Express U.N. Sanction?
In order to determine whether the Gulf War set a new precedent for the
exercise of coercive arms control as a means of self-defense, it is necessary
to consider whether the Gulf War can be categorized as a lawful exercise of
self-defense. An inquiry into the Gulf War's legality as an exercise of self-
defense begins with the text of Article 51.
Article 51 states, in part, "[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."" 0
As one observer has astutely noted, "The statutory language [of Article 51]
is not a model of clarity.""' In particular, considerable confusion seems to
exist over the significance of the word "until."
In the months before the Gulf War, Abram Chayes and U.N. Secretary-
General Javier P6rez de Cu6llar strongly suggested that there was no
continuing right to collective self-defense under Article 51.12 Once the
230. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
231. Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article 51: Linits on Self-Defense?, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 336, 339
(1992).
232. Professor Chayes' comments were given at the Conference on International Law and the Non-
Use of Force, convened jointly by the American Society of International Law and the Soviet Association
of International Law, in Washington, D.C., on October 4-6, 1990. See id. at 340. An argument similar
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Security Council takes action on an issue, all initiative for resolving the crisis
passes to the Council. In the matter of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it was
argued that since the Security Council had already passed several resolutions
on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States, absent some further
provocation by Iraq or authorization from the Security Council, could not use
force to liberate Kuwait under Article 51. A number of legal scholars
supported this interpretation after the war.23
Other scholars, however, have presented powerful arguments that the
word "until" is of little significance in reaching a judgment about the legality
of collective self-defense in the Gulf War. First, such an argument fails to
take account of the language of resolutions adopted by the Security Council
in the summer and fall of 1990. The very first Security Council resolution to
adopt measures to restore international peace and security (economic
sanctions) specifically affirmed the "inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense. " 4 As Professor Schachter has observed, "The adoption of
sanctions and the simultaneous affirmation of self-defense are surely
inconsistent with an intention to bring an end to self-defense measures."231
Second, it has been argued that to read the text of Article 51 literally
would be "an implausible - indeed, absurd - interpretation."2"6 While
such an interpretation calls on an aggressor to withdraw, it would
simultaneously deprive a victim state of the right to defend itself if the
aggressor ignored the Security Council's call. Subordinating the right of self-
defense to prior permission from the Security Council would be seriously
detrimental to the ability of states to defend themselves:
What the Charter prescribes is precisely the opposite rule: that the aggrieved state and its
friends and allies may decide for themselves when to exercise their rights of individual and
collective self-defense until peace is restored or the Security Council, by its own affirmative
vote, decides that self-defense has gone too far and become a threat to the peace.'
Third, such an interpretation of Article 51 is at odds with the drafters's
intent. As the drafting history makes clear, language that would have
explicitly terminated the right of continuing self-defense after the Security
Council took action was proposed and rejected."3 As one discerning analyst
of the Charter's travaux prdparatoires concludes, "[T]he rejection of the
proposed changes supports the argument that defensive rights are ongoing and
to Chayes' was offered by a Soviet professor of law, Rein Mullerson, at the same conference. See Rostow,
supra note 189, at 511. For the Secretary-General's remarks, see U.N. Article SI May Not Permit Strike
at Iraq, WASH. PoST, Nov. 9, 1990, at A30.
233. See, e.g., Dallal, supra note 38, at 136-37; Franck & Patel, supra note 63, at 63; Quigley,
supra note 36, at 37-42.
234. S.C. Res. 661, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at7, U.N. Doc. SIRES/661 (1990).
235. Schachter, supra note 42, at 458.
236. Id.
237. Rostow, supra note 189, at 510; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, Asking the U.N. Is Asking for
Trouble, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at A14.
238. Plofchan, supra note 231, at 351.
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do not cease upon simply any action of the Security Council, but only upon
those actions of the Security Council that explicitly terminate a State's self-
defense rights or several States's collective-security rights."" Since the
Security Council did exactly the opposite by authorizing the use of necessary
means to liberate Kuwait and restore international security to the region via
Resolution 678, it is reasonable to conclude that the exercise of self-defense
was legal in the Gulf War.
However, the fact that the exercise of the broad and traditional right of
self-defense - the right to repel an invader - in the Gulf War may have been
legal does not automatically imply that the exercise of the specific act of
coercive arms control during the War was legal. Indeed, even if the actual
choice of target is excluded from consideration, the American raid on
Tuwaitha has far more in common with the Israeli raid of 1981 than with the
1962 missile crisis.
Similarities between the American raid in 1991 and the Israeli raid in
1981 exist on a number of levels. First, there is the issue of immediacy.
Unlike 1962, there was no provocative deployment of nuclear weapons in
1991. As in 1981, the concern was with potential forces as opposed to forces-
in-being. While Iraq was suspected of having a nuclear weapons program
before the onset of Desert Storm, no evidence linked the internationally
safeguarded reactors240 at Tuwaitha with such a program. Instead of trying
to develop a plutonium-fueled bomb, which would require nuclear reactors,
Iraq was pursuing the enriched uranium route to nuclear weapons capability.
Thus, the research reactors posed no significant threat, and the raid on them
could not possibly have advanced either Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait or
international peace and stability. Indeed, numerous postwar inspections have
failed to turn up any linkage between the research reactors and the massive
Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program.24
Second, there is the related issue of premeditation. As in the 1981 Israeli
239. Id. at 352.
240. Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are required to accept certain safeguards so that
the International Atomic Energy Agency can verify the parties' fulfillment of their obligations. Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, open for signature July 1, 1968, art. III, 21 U.S.T. 483, 487-
89, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 172.
241. Iraq apparently experimented with at least three methods of uranium enrichment, but devoted
most of its resources to electromagnetic separation ("calutron") enrichment, a method the United States
abandoned after World War II as too expensive and inefficient. See Report by the Special Commission
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 21-24, U.N. Doc.
S/23165 (1991) [hereinafter Special Conun'n Repon]; see also Mark Hibbs, Inspectors Find Four Calutron
Enrichment Plants in Iraq, NUCLEARFUEL, July 22, 1991, at 6.
Nothing in this text is meant to suggest that the 1991 raid on Tuwaitha was either poorly planned
or without reason. As suggested earlier, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, there was at least one
good political reason that the Bush administration targeted Tuwaitha. Late in the fall of 1990, the Bush
administration began increasingly to justify its action against Iraq in terms of non-proliferation.
Consequently, having justified war on the basis of Iraq's latent nuclear threat, the administration could
hardly not strike at the most visible manifestation of that threat. Indeed, given the administration's
ignorance of the breadth and depth of the Iraqi nuclear program, there were precious few other targets on
which to demonstrate its commitment to non-proliferation.
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raid, the U.S. attack in 1991 was deliberate and well-planned. While the
United States did not have the luxury of building a mock-up of the Iraqi
reactor as Israel did in preparation for its 1981 raid,242 it had nearly three
months to plan the attack.243 The fact that the U.S. raid came during the
first week of the war strongly suggests that Tuwaitha was not a target of
opportunity but a priority on a lengthy target list.
The issue of premeditation becomes all the more troubling given the
failure to search for alternative means to resolve the crisis. While the United
States did engage in a prolonged diplomatic dance with Iraq in search of a
peaceful resolution to the crisis, a dance that lasted until just a few days
before the war,2 " it devoted almost no effort to resolving the crisis over
Iraq's unconventional weapons capability. Indeed, the "crisis" over Iraq's
unconventional weapons capability really did not begin until well after the war
was over, as U.N. inspection teams began to discover the full extent of Iraq's
clandestine nuclear weapons program. 45 Thus, because of the lack of
immediacy as well as the high degree of premeditation, the American raid on
Tuwaitha seems to be sharply at odds with both the customary law of
anticipatory self-defense and the law of anticipatory self-defense/coercive arms
control as developed through state practice since 1945.
Because of similarities with the 1981 Israeli raid, the American raid on
Tuwaitha may appear at first glance to be an illegal exercise of coercive arms
control. A more sustained analysis, however, reveals important similarities to
the legal American exercise of coercive arms control in the 1962 missile
crisis. First, both received ex post facto U.N. endorsement, thereby rendering
the debate over legality largely moot. More important, both the 1991 raid and
the 1962 quarantine were supported by a community of states. In 1962, it was
the OAS, a formal, standing regional organization committed to international
security in the Western Hemisphere. In 1991, it was an ad hoc coalition of
states concerned with stability in the Persian Gulf area. This regional support
created a presumption of legality in both cases.
The presumption of legality arises because reliance on regional
organizations outside the United Nations is consistent with the intent of the
242. Russell, supra note 166, at 26.
243. This assumes that the decision to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait was taken by
the United States in mid-October, following the "Temple Mount" incident on October 8, 1990 in
Jerusalem. The chronology of events and the initial reporting on U.S. decisionmaking support this. On
October 30, President Bush decided to increase the U.S. military commitment to Saudi Arabia by an
additional 150,000 troops, bringing the total U.S. presence to nearly 400,000. President Bush announced
this decision on November 8, explaining that the additional forces were meant to give the coalition an
"offensive military option." See WOODWARD, supra note 45, at 297-321; Joao Resende-Santos, The
Persian Gulf Crisis: A Chronology of Events, in AFTER THE STORM, supra note 82, at 295, 318-25.
244. See Resende-Santos, supra note 243, at 328-33 (chronicling many diplomatic efforts involving
United States, Iraq, European Community, and United Nations between November 30, 1990 and January
15, 1991).
245. See, e.g., U.N. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1991, at A1; Reassessing Iraqi Nuclear Capability, WASH. POST, July 10, 1991, at A16.
1994]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Charter's framers. As one scholar points out, "the sponsoring powers [of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals] envisioned that regional arrangements would
provide the means for dealing with most conflicts and that the Security
Council would concern itself only with the most serious."" This sentiment
in favor of regional initiatives found clear expression in Article 52, which
provides, in part:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies
for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.U?
In a searching examination of the drafting history behind Article 52, one
scholar discovered that the drafters did not intend the division of labor
between the Security Council and regional arrangements to be
hierarchical.24 The Charter allows regional arrangements considerable
initiative and independence. Moreover, the framers of the Charter were very
liberal in their definition of what constituted a regional arrangement. The
drafting history of the Charter indicates that the framers were willing to
consider almost any grouping of states as a bona fide regional arrangement.
They rejected a proposal to restrict regional arrangements to organizations of
a permanent nature that were geographically and culturally linked.249
Instead, the definition that was adopted "was completely amorphous and
appears to permit any amalgamation of States to qualify as a regional
arrangement. " 25 Almost "any agreement between two States could qualify
as a regional arrangement justifying participation in a collective defense
effort. "251
This broad definition of regional arrangements, viewed in the context of
the Gulf War, creates a lower legal threshold for the exercise of coercive
arms control. Based solely on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1981 Israeli
raid, one might reasonably conclude that official support from a formal
regional or international organization is necessary in order to carry out an act
of coercive arms control under the self-defense exception of the U.N. Charter.
The ad hoc regional arrangement that was used to prosecute the Gulf War and
carry out coercive arms control against Iraq, however, may have broadened
the definition of regional arrangements under which coercive arms control can
be legally carried out. Perhaps it affirmed the Charter's broad definition of
246. Plofchan, supra note 231, at 348.
247. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, 1.
248. Plofchan, supra note 231, at 355. As one delegate to the drafting conference in 1945 declared,
there "can be no double jurisdiction or competence as between that of the Security Council ... and that
of the regional organization. The Council should limit its action to investigating ... any situation which
may threaten peace, and to promoting the regional settlement of the problem." Doc. 576, supra note 150,
at 684.
249. Plofchan, supra note 231, at 361-63.
250. Id. at 363.
251. Id.
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regional arrangements allowed to exercise collective self-defense and
established a powerful new precedent for the future use of coercive arms
control.
D. The Gulf War: A Meaningful New Precedent for Coercive Arms Control?
For the expansive notion of coercive arms control implicit in the 1991
U.S. raid on Tuwaitha to be considered a meaningful precedent under
international law, it must, as noted earlier, 2 possess two elements:
authority and control. Recent state behavior in the aftermath of the Gulf War
suggests that an expansive notion of coercive arms control possesses not only
authority, but also control.
It is tempting to immediately dismiss this conclusion by arguing that it
overreaches the truth; the Security Council's endorsement of the American
raid on Tuwaitha was but a momentary aberration brought on by the stunning
reversal of an act of naked aggression. The problem with this interpretation
is that it ignores the Security Council's decision in January 1992, one year
after the war with Iraq, to enforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) by all "appropriate measures" in the event of a violation by any
signatory. 3 It could also be argued that the legitimacy conferred by the
international community on expansive coercive arms control measures, while
enduring, is confined to measures against Iraq. After all, the final declaration
agreed upon in January 1992 by the heads of state of the Security Council,
although it stated that "[t]he proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction
constitutes a threat to international peace and security,"' was prompted by
Iraq's unrepentant obstruction of the implementation of the cease-fire
agreement." 5 But if that were the case, what accounts for the recent
252. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
253. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23500
(1992) [hereinafter Doc. S123500]; see also Stanley Meisler & Norman Kempster, World Leaders Urge
U.N. to Safeguard Rights Everywhere, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at Al (describing first ever Security
Council meeting at level of heads of state and government).
254. Doc. S/23500, supra note 253, at 762.
255. In the six months preceding the January 1992 summit declaration, the Security Council passed
resolutions demanding Iraqi compliance with the disarmament provisions of Resolution 687. The more
important of the two resolutions was Resolution 707. See S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th
mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/707 (1991); see also Maureen Dowd, France Backs U.S. on Using Force If Iraq
Pursues Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at Al. In addition, the American cruise missile
attack against Iraq's intelligence headquarters on June 27, 1993 may have been linked to a tense standoff
between Iraq and the U.N. Special Commission over weapons inspections. On June 18, 1993, the Security
Council adopted a presidential statement that warned Iraq of "serious consequences" if it continued to
refuse to cooperate with the Special Commission. Robert L. Gallucci, Nuclear Situation in Iraq, 4 DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH 483 (1993). President Clinton's explanation for the June 27 attack stressed that it was in
retaliation for Iraq's planned assassination attempt against former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait.
President William Clinton, U.S. Responds to Attack by Iraqi Government, 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 473
(1993). Subsequent news reports, however, implied that the Clinton administration might be linking the
strike to the Iraqi inspection refusal. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, Raid on Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
1993, at A6.
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American"6 and South Korean"s7 threats of military action against North
Korea for its suspected nuclear weapons program? Or, more troubling, what
accounts for the Yinhe incident?
The Yinhe incident provides a compelling case study on the Gulf War's
legacy in the area of coercive arms control. Beginning in late July 1993,
American warships and military aircraft began tracking a Chinese freighter,
the Yinhe, suspected of transporting chemicals to be used in Iran's chemical
warfare program. By a combination of military force and diplomatic pressure,
the United States barred the Yinhe from entering the Persian Gulf until after
it had submitted to a detailed inspection of its cargo.2"
This incident is distinguishable from previous coercive arms control
exercises discussed for three reasons. First, unlike the Israeli and American
raids against Tuwaitha, military force was directed not against the suspected
proliferating state, but against one of its purported suppliers. Second, unlike
the American strike against Tuwaitha, there was not even an ex post facto
confirmation that the American action was justified. After the war with Iraq,
international inspection revealed a secret multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons
program.2' 9 Consequently, while the United States' aim may have been a
little off in attacking Tuwaitha, its intuition was on target. The same cannot
be said for the Yinhe incident. A detailed search by a Sino-Saudi inspection
team, accompanied by an American advisor, found that the Yinhe was
carrying only metals, stationary, and machine parts. No chemical weapon
precursors were listed on the ship's manifest or hidden in its holds. 2 0
256. Standing at the "Bridge of No Return" connecting the two Korean states through the
Demilitarized Zone, President Clinton stated in July 1993 that it was "pointless for [North Korea] to try
to develop nuclear weapons, because if they ever use them, it would mean the end of their country." UPI
White House Reporter, UPI, July 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. President
Clinton's remarks were foreshadowed by John M. Deutch. Shortly before joining the Clinton
administration as an undersecretary of defense, Deutch argued in the fall of 1992 that "[the United States,
preferably in a multilateral context, should state that any use of a nuclear weapon would be considered a
casus belli and that violation of the NPT would trigger specific sanctions, including the possibility of
multilateral and, in exceptional cases, unilateral military action." John M. Deutch, The New Nuclear
Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1992, at 120, 133.
257. Over the course of 1991, South Korea threatened military action against the North Korean
reprocessing plant at Pyongyang three times. In April, South Korea's defense minister, Lee Jong-koo, was
quoted as saying that his government would consider launching a "commando raid" against Pyongyang
if North Korea developed nuclear weapons. David E. Sanger, Furor in Seoul over North's Atom Plant,
N.Y. TIMEs, April 16, 1991, at A3. In September, Lee warned that unless North Korea agreed to
international inspection of Pyongyang, "military action" would be taken. N. Korea Pressed on Arms
Checks, CHIc. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1991, at 14. Finally, in November, South Korean officials "issued a
strongly worded statement saying Washington and Seoul would 'pursue all available means' to halt
attempts in the North to become a nuclear power." Colin Nickerson, North Korea Warned on Atom Plans,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1991, at 2.
258. This inspection was eventually accomplished at the Saudi port of Damman, and the Yinhe was
found to be carrying "no trace of the thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride as alleged by Washington." Jeffrey
Parker, U.S.A. "Laughing Stock" Over China Ship Incident, Reuters, Sept. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuter File.
259. See Special Comm'n Report, supra note 241.
260. Parker, supra note 258; Chinese Shipping Company Calls for Legal Action in Yinhe Affair,
Agence France Presse, Sept. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
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Third, unlike the American raid against Tuwaitha, where the United
States had the mantle of Security Council authority, however attenuated, this
recent attempt at coercive arms control was dressed in nothing more than a
legal fig leaf. Although both China and Iran had signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the production, stockpiling, or use
of chemical weapons, and prohibits any assistance to a country developing
such weapons, the CWC had not yet entered into force.261 Even if the CWC
were in force, the authorized measures to ensure compliance do not include
unilateral state action. Instead of bringing the matter to the CWC's
Conference of State Parties or to the U.N. General Assembly or Security
Council as required by the CWC, 262 the United States acted on its own
authority.26 Despite the absence of any compelling legal authority, the
international community, with the exception of China,264 has expressed little
concern over the American role in this incident.
Thus, the Yinhe incident is a recent example of coercive arms control that
goes beyond the Gulf War precedent. Moreover, it provides an example of
what may be the most well-defined feature of the still evolving post-Cold War
world. While concern over the proliferation of unconventional weapons is not
new, a willingness by the international community in general and the United
States in particular to use or threaten the use of military force to counter such
proliferation is new. 265 The Clinton administration took an important step
in institutionalizing the counterproliferation agenda in late 1993 when then-
Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced a new defense program designed to
produce specially tailored operational plans and weapon systems to combat the
261. The CWC does not enter into force until it has been ratified by 65 countries and not before
January 13, 1995. See CWC, supra note 8, art. XXI(1).
262. Id. art. XII(4).
263. Instead of relying on the CWC, the United States could attempt to justify its action under the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC). Documents
of the 32nd Session (1980), 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 14,30-34, U.N. Doe. A.CN. 4/SER.A/19801Add.1.
Under the Draft Articles, the United States could either argue that China's action in and of itself was
"wrong" because it constituted a breach of an international obligation (Article 3) or alternatively that it
was "wrong" because it assisted another state's wrongful act (Article 27). There are two principal
problems with this reasoning. First, there are serious doubts as to whether the work of the ILC is a source
of international law. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 121-38 (1987). Second,
even if the ILC is seen as the equivalent of international legal scholarship, there is no authority in the
Draft Articles for unilateral state action to correct a "wrong." For an interesting attempt to apply the Draft
Articles to the military aid provided to Iraq prior to the invasion of Kuwait, see Paul Rubenstein,
Comment, State Responsibilityfor Failure to Control the Export of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 319 (1993).
264. In an address before the U.N. General Assembly, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen denounced the "hegemonistic conduct of a self-styled 'world cop.'" Anthony Goodman,
China Lashes U.S. as "Self-Styled 'World Cop,'" Reuters, Sept. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuter File.
265. Symbolic of this new order is a change in vocabulary. The term "non-proliferation" has become
pass6 among those inside and outside of the American government. The preferred choice among those
walking the corridors of power in Washington seems to be "counter-proliferation," while among the
cognoscenti who reside outside the government but inside the Beltway, the favored label may be "anti-
proliferation." See Roberts, supra note 95, at 139.
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proliferation of unconventional weaponry.266 The aggressive leadership of
recent American presidents on proliferation matters has seemingly found an
echo among the American public. A recent poll indicated that many
Americans would view nuclear weapons development in North Korea as a
serious threat, and more than half of those polled said they would support the
use of force to eliminate such capability.267 In short, whatever the label, the
movement away from reactive strategies toward proactive strategies of arms
control seems both evident and unlikely to be reversed in the near future.268
If a more expansive rule is slowly acquiring both authority and control,
this is significant in two ways. First, it represents a major change in direction
for international law. The abiding focus of modern international law has been
the prevention of war. From the Covenant of the League of Nations to the
Kellogg-Briand Pact to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the central concern
has been to restrict a state's ability to wage war. As Professor O'Brien has
noted, "modern international law has sacrificed justice in its attempt to
virtually eliminate the competence of the state to engage in war
unilaterally. "269 With a more permissive rule on coercive arms control, the
hierarchy of values is the same - peace over justice - but the means
available to realize those values is changing. Force may now be used
proactively, not just reactively, to prevent the outbreak of war.
Second, a new rule on coercive arms control is significant in that it
represents a greater commitment to sustain the international regimes for the
non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic
missiles. The essence of any international regime is its injunctions, which
follow most directly from its norms or its "standards of behavior defined in
terms of rights and obligations." 27 Given that "no single counterfactual
occurrence refutes a norm," 27 the norm remains valid. For instance, the
conviction for drunk driving of a person, or for that matter of a thousand
people, does not necessarily destroy the normative order against operating an
automobile while intoxicated. What is important for normative orders is not
just the degree of observance, as has been suggested,272 but community
266. Art Pine, Pentagon Unveils Plan to Counter Mass-Destruction Arms, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1993, at A4.
267. David Lauter, 51% Would Back Force Over . Korea A-Arms, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1993,
at Al.
268. See Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy in a New Strategic Environment, In
ARMS CONTROL: WHAT NEXT? 58, 61 (Lewis A. Dunn & Sharon A. Squassoni eds., 1993) (identifying
new trend in non-proliferation that includes "[t]hreatening to use, or resorting to, force in order to
constrain a country's nuclear program when all other means of inducing compliance appear to have fallen
short of the desired objective").
269. WILLIAM O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 23 (1981).
270. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
271. Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on
an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753, 767 (1986).
272. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Diplomacy of Nuclear Proliferation, in NEGOTIATiNG WORLD ORDER
79, 92 (Alan K. Henrickson ed., 1986).
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reaction to deviations from the norm.273 Thus for the various non-
proliferation regimes, validity is assessed not only in the rate of proliferation,
but also in how the international community responds to violations. By making
coercive arms control more practicable, the new rule will work to reinforce
the various non-proliferation norms.
However, as with the future exercise of collective coercive arms control
discussed in Part II, serious obstacles make actions similar to the raid on
Tuwaitha doubtful under the self-defense exception to the Charter. First, and
perhaps most daunting, is the detection of provocative "certain steps." Respect
for the various non-proliferation regimes has not ended proliferation, but in
many cases has instead driven it underground. This "silent spread"274 or
"opaque proliferation"275 makes detection extraordinarily difficult, as the
United States discovered after the Gulf War.276 The experience with Iraq's
clandestine program is not unique. The United States was only able to detect
Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 because Soviet officers ignored orders to
camouflage the missile sites.2' Despite the sophistication of its overhead
reconnaissance, the United States reportedly relied on human sources to help
confirm the presence of a chemical weapon facility at Rabta, Libya.278
A second obstacle is the difficulty of mobilizing domestic support for an
active and sustained coercive arms control campaign. This is an essential
ingredient in maintaining the non-proliferation regimes because non-
proliferation is an ongoing commitment. Iraq's ability to regenerate a capacity
to dominate the Persian Gulf region not long after its devastating defeat,
despite sanctions and intrusive monitoring, illustrates this point.279 The
domestic political problems inherent in an aggressive non-proliferation policy
were recognized as far back as 1946. In responding to Bernard Baruch's
proposal for "swift and condign punishment" for any violation of his 1946
plan for the international control of atomic energy, Admiral Chester Nimitz
273. I have explored this more fully elsewhere. See Roger K. Smith, Institutionalization as a
Measure of Regime Stability: Insights for Regime Analysis from the Study of Domestic Politics, 18
MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 227 (1989).
274. Leonard S. Spector, Proliferation: The Silent Spread, 58 FOREIGN POL'Y 53 (1985).
275. OPAQUE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: METHODOLOGICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Benjamin
Frankel ed., 1991).
276. When the U.S. raid on Tuwaitha was announced, General Norman Schwarzkopf asserted that
Iraq's ability to develop nuclear weapons had suffered a "considerable setback if not a total setback."
Atkinson & Devroy, supra note 3, at Al.
277. Fred Kaplan, '62 Missile Crisis Key Soviet Slip Suggested, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1987, at
Al.
278. ASPEN STRATEGY GROUP, NEW THREATS: RESPONDING TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR,
CHEMICAL, AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD 16 (1990).
Two factors will complicate the collection of intelligence on opaque proliferators. The first is that
after the Gulf War, those states intent on acquiring unconventional weapons will devote even more time
to cloaking their weapons infrastructure and sources of supply. Second, countries intent on stopping
proliferation face their own internal organizational problems. For example, it was notuntil September 1991
that the Central Intelligence Agency created a Center for Nonproliferation to coordinate intelligence
gathering efforts. Bill Gertz, CIA Creates Center to Monitor Arms, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, at A5.
279. Art Pine, Iraq Rebuilds Its Forces, House Told, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1993, at Al.
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expressed "grave misgivings."2 Nimitz did not believe that the American
public was prepared to enter into any plan for "automatic punishment of other
nations for acts which do not directly concern the United States. In other
words, the people of the United States will in fact insist on the power of their
elected representatives to veto the deliberate entry of the United States into
war."281 Nimitz' forebodings proved to be well founded. In 1968, for
example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk had to repeatedly reassure senators
that the NPT would not entail any additional U.S. military commitments.282
While it may be true that during the Gulf War the President was able to
"box" Congress in and transform the latest opinion polls in his favor,283 and
that the President almost always wins foreign affairs contests with the
Congress,2" the forced timetable for withdrawal from Somalia shows that
the President's foreign affairs powers are limited.285
The limits on the U.S. President's ability to exercise coercive arms
control measures will have a direct impact on the stability of the various non-
proliferation regimes. As Professor Krasner has noted, there are "makers,
breakers, and takers" of international regimes. 286 The United States has been
the principal "maker" of the various non-proliferation regimes. As the one
remaining superpower, if it refuses to take aggressive action, it is less likely
that other states will.
A third obstacle that is related to both intelligence gathering and domestic
mobilization is military success. Even when intelligence is good and domestic
support strong, success on the battlefield is not guaranteed. An unsuccessful
attempt at coercive arms control is unlikely to generate future attempts.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay has sought to make legal and political sense of the Security
Council's endorsement of the U.S. strike against the Iraqi reactors at
Tuwaitha in 1991. Under the express terms of the U.N. Charter, American
military action against Tuwaitha could be justified either as an act authorized
by the Security Council or as an act of self-defense. Consequently, the
argument of this Essay has moved along two parallel tracks, one dealing with
280. Letter from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to Baruch (June 11, 1946), in I FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES 1946 853, 854 (1972).
281. Id.
282. Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States
Senate, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, 34-35, 40-42, 47-48 (1968) (testimony of Dean Rusk).
283. David R. Gergen, The Unfettered Presidency, in AFTER THE STORM, supra note 82, at 170.
284. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons
of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
285. See Helen Dewar, Senate Vote Reaffirms Somalia Deadline: Compromise Holds Clinton to
Pullout Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1993, at A30.
286. Stephen D. Krasner, United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox
of Fxternal Strength and Internal Weakness, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATES 51, 52 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1978).
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the raid as a collective exercise of coercive arms control authorized by the
United Nations, and the other dealing with the raid as an exercise of coercive
arms control for purposes of self-defense.
On the first track, this Essay argued that the Charter gives the Security
Council powers broad enough to include the authorization of coercive arms
control, that such authorizations have been given prior to the Gulf War, and
that the exercise of the Security Council's authority in the Gulf War was
legal. This Essay also argued, however, that the authorization did not
constitute a meaningful new precedent for the collective exercise of coercive
arms control because of the uniqueness of the situation and the prevailing
institutional weakness of the United Nations.
On the second track, this Essay argued that although neither anticipatory
self-defense nor coercive arms control is explicitly mentioned by the Charter,
both have been endorsed by the Security Council. Moreover, the Gulf War
may be seen as a permissible exercise of self-defense that broadened the scope
of the legal exercise of unilateral or multilateral coercive arms control without
U.N. sanction. The second half of this Essay concluded with the observation
that a new understanding of the permissible uses of military action, based in
part on the 1991 raid against Tuwaitha, is slowly being institutionalized in the
United States. This understanding stands at the center of the international
regimes designed to prevent the proliferation of unconventional weaponry.
The shift in the way nations think about force, while consistent with the
hierarchy of values inherent in the Charter, is strikingly at odds with the
central thrust of modern international law. Instead of trying to constrain a
state's ability to resort to military force, this new paradigm opens more room
for state discretion in using force. Resolution 678 did not by itself inaugurate
this change. The change was, in part, inherent in the Charter. But more
important, the paradigm has been evolving since 1945 as states wrestled with
the dilemmas of living with nuclear weapons. Consequently, it is neither an
exception to a rule nor a completely new rule. But it is a rule that will
probably not disappear. Given the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, it is likely that this shift will take roots and grow, as it has
already done within the American government. Coercive arms control merits
much closer observation by scholars and statesmen, for it is fundamentally a
frontal attack on state sovereignty.
Not long after Hiroshima, Albert Einstein issued a challenge to the
international community: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed
everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled
catastrophe .... [A] new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to
survive."2 7 The question for future research is a normative one: whether
legalizing coercive arms control meets Einstein's challenge.
287. Robert R. Holt, Can Psychology Meet Einstein's Challenge?, 5 POL. PSYCHOL. 199, 199-200
(1984).
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